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Abstract 
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders are allowed to put bids on a bundle of 
items, are the subject of increasing research in recent years. When bidders have 
complementarities and substitutabilities among items, combinatorial auctions 
can lead to better social efficiencies than single-item auctions in resource allo-
cation problems. Although many work have been conducted on combinatorial 
auctions, most of them focus on the winner determination problem and the 
auction design. A large unexplored research area in combinatorial auctions is 
the design of bidding strategies. In this work, we propose three bidding strate-
gies: an adaptive strategy in static markets , an adaptive strategy in dynamic 
markets and a Q-learning based adaptive strategy in static markets. The profit 
margin (state) of the bidder using any proposed strategy is updated from time 
to time according to the bidder 's bidding history and quickly converges to the 
optimal one, which guarantees that the bidder can obtain a high profit in dif-
ferent market environments. Through experiments, we show that even without 
any prior knowledge, the performance of each propo~ed strategy is much better 
than that of the random strategy and is close to that of the intelligent strategy 
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1.1 MAS-Based Resource Allocation Problems 
In the recent few decades, there has been an increasing interest in the research 
of multiagent systems (MAS). According to Jack Krupansky, a multiagent 
system is "a collection of software agents that work in conjunction with each 
other. They may cooperate or they may compete, or some combination of 
cooperation and competition, but there is some common infrastructure that 
result in the collection being a 'system', as opposed to simply being a disjoint 
set of autonomous agents" . Generally, the agents in a multi-agent system 
should have the following characteristics [49]: 
- Autonomous: Capable of acting independently, exhibiting control over 
their internal state. 
- Distributed Information: no agent has a full global knowledge of the 
system 
Based on the definition, multiagent systems can be broadly divided into 
two categories: cooperative multiagent systems and competitive multiagnet 
systems. Cooperative multiagent systems are those in which all the agents have 
a same system objective and behave cooperatively to achieve that goal. This 
is an important topic in AI since many large-scale applications are formulated 
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in terms of spatially or functionally distributed entities. Collaboration enables 
the different entities to work more efficiently and to complete activities they 
are not able to accomplish individually. A case example of a cooperative 
multiagent system is a team of robots which act together to explore a large 
unknown area, which can not be done by any single robots. 
A more general category is the competitive multiagent systems. In such 
systems, each agent has his own profit function and will act to maximize his 
profit. Here the term "competitive" may be misleading because sometimes, 
some agent may act cooperatively, e.g. enter into a collusion, to compete 
with the others. Therefore, a better saying is that a competitive multiagnet 
system is a system in which a set of self-interested agents interact with each 
other. The key way that the competitive multiagent systems differentiate with 
the cooperative multiagent system is that agents cannot be assumed to have 
common objectives and each of them will act strategically according to their 
own interests. An example of a competitive multiagent system is a grid-like 
computer system for the resource allocation problem, which is shown in Figure 
1.1. 
In this example, a grid-like computer system (represented by the cloud 
in the figure) is providing computational resources to a group of consumers. 
Such resources can be CPU time, memory spaces , network bandwidth, disk 
spaces and so on. Each consumer, either a user or a software agent, needs 
some resources to perform his own task, e.g. user 1 needs some CPU time and 
memory spaces to perform a computing task and agent 2 needs some network 
bandwidth and disk spaces to perform a storage task. Base on these requests , 
the system will make a decision on how to allocate these resources according 
to a criterion, in which some requests may not be satisfied due to the scarcity 
of resources. 
Actually, with the evolution of large computer networks at the beginning of 
the 80s , resource allocation problems like the above example is becoming more 
Chapter 1 Introduction 3 
Figure 1.1 An example of a competitive multiagent system: a grid-like system 
for the resource allocation problem 
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and more important [19]. They can be modeled as competitive multiagent sys-
tems because: 1) each resource consumers in the system can be regarded as an 
autonomous agent; 2) there is no common objective among these consumers 
and each of them is self-interested that he only cares about his own interest. 
However, unlike its easily solved by introducing a central control unit in a co-
operative multiagent system, the resource allocation problem in a competitive 
multiagent system is non-trivial. First, as each agent has its own interest and 
acts to maximize its own profit, a negotiation protocol must be specified to 
determine the possible actions that an agent can take at different time of the 
interaction. Some frequently-used protocols are: voting, auctions, bargaining, 
coalition formation, and so on. Secondly, as there is no central control unit in 
a competitive multiagent system, a criterion must be specified to evaluate the 
efficiency of the allocation. Some frequently-used criteria are: social-welfare 
(maximizing the sum of agents' utilities), revenue maximization (maximizing 
the money that agents pay in exchange for the resources allocated to them), 
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pareto-efficiency (finding an allocation that there is no other allocations such 
that at least one agent is better off and no agent is worse off), and so on. 
1.2 Combinatorial Auction As a Solution 
With the emerging applications of resource allocation in network, the economic 
models have received more and more attention [28] [5] [31] [48] [32] [13]. The sem-
inal article "Incentive Engineering for Computational Resource Management" 
[16] and the book "Market-based Control" [13] are two crucial basis for this 
research area. 
Compared with other approaches for resource allocation [10] [42] [18] [12], 
auctions have been particularly preferred as they are decentralized in nature, 
they require little global information, they are easy to implement , they pro-
vide immense flexibility for participants to specify their valuations, and so 
on. There have been several works on using auctions to solve the resource 
allocation problem in networks [11 ][21 ][25][26][50]. 
However , most of these works assume that the resources to be auctioned 
are homogenous, which means that if a bidder want to obtain a resource bun-
dle with more than one type of resource, he needs to participate in multiple 
auctions. For example, in the example shown in Figure 1.1 , the user 1, who 
needs the CPU time and memory spaces simultaneously, has to join into two 
auctions, one for the CUP time and the other for the memory spaces, in which 
case he is under the risk of getting only one of them without getting the other. 
In this example, the bidder needs them simultaneously to perform his task that 
getting only one of them equals getting nothing. So the bidder will pay prices 
for the obtained resources but without performing his task and the auctioneer 
will waste the resources because he allocates them to an bidder who will not 
use them, which is an expected situation from the view of both the bidder and 
the auctioneer. 
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Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on a combination of items, 
called "packages", rather than just individual items [14], have received much 
attention from researchers in both computer science and economics [15]. Com-
binatorial auctions can lead to more economical allocations of resources than 
traditional auctions when bidders have complementarities and substitutabili-
ties among them. Consider the previous example in which the user 1 need the 
CUP time and memory spaces simultaneously, there is complementary among 
the CPU time and memory space and the bidder can put a package bid to 
request both of them simultaneously. According to the allocation rule that 
the bidder gets the whole bundle or gets nothing, the bidder can be prevented 
from getting partial requested resources and being unable to perform his task. 
In addition, the auctioneer's revenue increases because the expressiveness will 
result in an more efficient allocations of the resources in which the bidders 
are not stuck with some bundles that they have low valuations. Therefore, 
combinatorial auctions serve as a natural solution for the resource allocation 
problem, which improve the allocation efficiency from the view of both the bid-
der and the auctioneer. Such improvements have also been demonstrated in 
many other applications of the resource allocation problem [36] [39] [4] [33] [17]. 
1.3 Strategy Issues 
Due to the expressiveness, combinatorial auctions differ with the traditional 
single-item auction and receive much attention in the last decade. For example, 
the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions, which aims at 
computing the optimal allocation of resources among bidder, is proved to be 
NP-hard [38] while that in the single-item auction is polynomial time solvable. 
In addition, the number of bundles that a bidder can bid in combinatorial 
auctions is exponential with the number of items. However, that number is 
only one in the single-item auction. 
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The most two widely studied problems are the winner determination and 
the auction design. As mentioned above, the winner determination problem 
is to allocate the resources most efficiently, in which both optimal algorithms 
and approximate algorithms [40][20][52][6][23] are studied. Auction design in-
volves the designing of different protocols for combinatorial auctions, such as 
single-round versus multi-rounds, sealed-bid versus open-bid and false-name-
proof [35][14][51 ][37][3]. In addition, the computational mechanism design 
for combinatorial auctions, that is to design a computational feasible while 
truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions, is also a vibrant research area 
[30] [34] [29] [2] [22]. 
Another area of research on combinatorial auctions is the design of bidding 
strategies. When talking about the bidding strategies, we must incorporate 
certain type of auction protocol. Therefore, we will introduce some basic auc-
tion protocols in the auction theory before specifying our proposed strategies. 
Generally, there are four types of auction protocols. The best-known one 
is the English auction, where the auctioneer starts with a minimum price and 
each bidder is free to increase his bid. The auction ends when there is only 
one bidder claiming, whom the item is awarded to the claiming price is paid. 
The English auction is also referred to as the first-price open-bid auction. The 
Dutch auction is exactly the opposite protocol of the English auction. The 
auctioneer sets an initially high price and each bidder is free to decrease his 
bid. The auction ends when there is only one bidder claiming, whom the item is 
awarded to the claiming price is paid. In the first- price sealed-bid auction, each 
bidder submit his bid in an envelope without knowing the others ' . The highest 
bidder wins the item and pays his bidding price. In the second-price sealed-bid 
auction, each bidder submit his bid in an envelop without knowing the others ' . 
The highest bidder wins but pays the price that the second highest bidder bids. 
The second-price sealed-bid auction is also referred to as the Vickrey auction. 
As combinatorial auctions are incorporated with the first-price sealed-bid 
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auction protocol in many applications [14], we are especially interested in bid-
ding strategies in this kind of auction in this paper .1 Unlike the Vickrey A uc-
tion, where bidding truthfully is the dominant strategy, no dominant strategy 
exists in the first- price sealed-bid combinatorial auctions [27]. In combina-
torial auctions, since the number of possible bundles is exponential with the 
number of items, and the problem of how to bid in combinatorial auctions 
is absolutely non-trivial. When deciding his bids, the bidder must consider 
the following two questions: which resource bundle should I put bid on and 
how' much should I bid for a specific resource bundle. Although there are 
some previous works addressing the bidding strategies in the first-price sealed-
bid combinatorial auctions [9] [1] [41] [43] [4 7], those proposed strategies are not 
adaptive, which means that the results are built on some posterior analysis and 
are very restrictive to certain market types. We want to improve the exist-
ing work and proposed some strategies that are adaptive to the market types. 
To our knowledge, this is the first work on the adaptive bidding strategies in 
combinatorial auctions, which is the main motivation of this work. 
1.4 Structure of This Work 
Based on some heuristics and the principles of Q-learning [46] [45], we propose a 
set of adaptive strategies in this paper: an adaptive strategy in static markets, 
an adaptive strategy in dynamic markets and a Q-learning based adaptive 
strategy in static markets. The bidder adopting anyone of them can change 
his profit margin (state) from time to time according to his bidding history, 
and thus perceives and responds to the market in a timely way. Through 
simulations, we show that each of them performs well and generates high 
utilities in different markets when compared with the random strategy and the 
1 There are also some researches in the bidding strategies in other types of combinatorial 
auctions , e.g. Parkes proposed a myopic best-response bidding strategy in the first-price 
open-bid combinatorial auctions [35). 
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intelligent strategy generated according to the prior knowledge of the markets. 
In addition, we also show that the profit margin (state) of the bidder using 
any of them can converge quickly to the optimal one in different markets, and 
thus be capable of adapting to the current market environment, even without 
any prior knowledge. 
This work is structured as follows. In chapter 2 we present the combi-
natorial auction model used in this paper and some related work on bidding 
strategies in combinatorial auctions. In chapter 3, 4 and 5, we describe the 
adaptive strategy in static markets , the adaptive strategy in dynamic markets 
and the Q-learning based adaptive bidding strategy in static markets respec-
tively. In chapter 6, we hold a brief discussion on all the proposed strategies, 
and finally, In chapter 7, we conclude this paper and highlight some possible 
future work. 
Chapter 2 
Combinatorial Auctions and 
Bidding Strategies 
2.1 Con1binatorial Auctions for Resource Al-
location 
In this section, we describe the combinatorial auction model used for the com-
putational resource allocation problem. 
Suppose m types of resources are provided by a resource manager (auction-
eer) to a group of users (bidders). For each type of resource j E {1 , 2, ... , m} 
or M, there is a capacity Cj that denotes the total number of units that are 
available. The value of Cj can be either constant or varied over time. If such 
a value remains constant for all types of resources , then the market is referred 
to as static; otherwise, if the value of Cj keeps changing from time to time, the 
market is referred to as dynamic. 
These provided resources are competed by a group of n users. During 
the time of the auction, each user i E {1 , 2, ... , n} or N may need certain 
types of resources to perform his current task (the user A in example 1), 
and for each type of resource j , the maximum number of units that he can 
require for is dj . Each bidder submits a sealed-bid bi == (T, Pi (T)), where 
9 
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T == (tb t2 , ... , tm) is the resource bundle needed for the task, with tj being the 
number of units that resource j is requested by i and satisfying 0 < tj < dj , 
Vj E M, and Pi(T) is a positive number denoting the price i will pay for getting 
T. Note that here we only consider the simplest case where each bidder submit 
a single bid each time, which means that no bidding language is used. However , 
such an assumption does not limit the generalization of our method in cases 
where bidding languages are used, which will also be discussed in detail in the 
discussion section. 
After receiving bids from all users , the resource manager solves the winner 
determination problem, which is given by: 
n 
max L L Pi(T) xi(T) 
i=l Tc;M 
n 
s.t. LL x· (T)t · < c · VJ. EM 't J - J (2.1) 
i=l Tc;M,T3j 
xi (T) E {0, 1} 
where xi (T) == 1 if bidder i is allocated T. 
Each winning user i pays Pi (T), gets accesses to the resources , performs 
his own task, and returns the access control back to the resource manager. 
We refer to the process from the beginning of bids submission to the end of 
access control return as a round of a combinatorial auction. The winner of 
the previous round submits a new bid, while each loser continues to submit 
the lost bid. However, a same bid will be dropped if it has been attempted 
for T consecutive rounds, which means that the bidder has a limited patience. 
Because the resources are reusable , the combinatorial auction can be repeated 
for multiple rounds before closed by the resource manager. 
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2.2 Bidding Strategies in Con1binatorial Auc-
tions 
In combinatorial auctions, since the number of possible bundles is exponential 
in the number of items, the problem of how to bid in combinatorial auctions 
is absolutely non-trivial. When considering the strategy, two questions should 
be asked: which resource bundle should I bid on and how much should I bid 
for a specific resource bundle. Generally, we refer to the above two questions 
as the bundle strategy and the price strategy respectively. In addition, the 
combinatorial auction can also be categorized as single-round or multi-round 
depending on whether the auction is executed once or iteratively. In this 
section, we make our state-of-art survey on both strategies in combinatorial 
auctions. 
2.2.1 Berhault's Strategies 
The work of Berhault et al. [9] focus on the bundle strategy in single-round 
combinatorial auctions. They studied how to coordinate a team of mobile 
robots to visit a number of given targets in partially unknown terrain and 
propose four bidding strategies: 
• Three-Combination: Bid on all bundles with no more than n targets. 
This strategy quickly becomes infeasible for large n since the number of 
bundles increases exponentially in n. They used n == 3 in their experi-
ments. 
• Smart-Combination: Bid on all bundles that contain only one or two 
targets. Additionally, bid on the 6k bundles that have the highest surplus 
among all bundles containing 2 < l targets , where k is the total number 
of clusters. They used l == 3; 4; 5; 6 in their experiments, that is, the 
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robots bid on 4 x 6k bundles containing three, four, five, and six targets , 
respectively. 
• Nearest-Neighbor: Bid on all bundles that correspond to good se-
quences of targets, where good sequences are recursively defined as fol-
lows: Each single target is a good sequence. Appending target t to a 
good sequence ending in target s yields another good sequence if the 
surplus of the new sequence is greater than or equal to the surplus of the 
old sequence and t is the closest target to s among all targets not in the 
old sequence. 
• Graph-Cut: Generate a complete undirected graph whose vertices cor-
respond to the targets. The cost of an edge between two targets corre-
sponds to the optimistic travel cost between them. Generate a bundle 
that contains all targets in the graph. If the graph contains more than 
one target, generate additional bundles by using the maximum cut al-
gorithm to split the graph into two connected subgraphs and invoke the 
algorithm recursively for each of the two subgraphs. Since computing 
the maximum cut is NP-complete, they used the "Computation Opti-
mization Laboratory: Graph-Partition and Box-Constrained Quadratic 
Optimization" by Benson, Ye and Zhang to compute an approximation 
[8]. 
Through experiments they show that combinatorial auctions generally lead 
to significantly superior team performance than single-item auctions and gen-
erate very good results compared to an optimal centralized mechanism. They 
also provide insight into the performance of the above four bidding strate-
gies for combinatorial auctions with respect to criteria such as travel distance, 
travel time, robot utilization and the amount of communication and draw the 
conclusion that the Graph-Cut strategy clearly outperforms the other three. 
Actually, the bidder using the Graph-Cut strategy always chooses bundles in 
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which strong complementarities exist, which leads to its excellence when com-
pared with the other three. 
2.2.2 An's Strategies 
An et al. [1] also study the bundle strategy in single-round combinatorial auc-
tions. They first proposed a simple model for evaluating the value of any 
bundle given pair wise synergies, under the consideration that computing the 
val~ations for all bundle is prohibitively time consuming. According to this 
synergy model, for a singleton bid, the bundle value is the item value. For a 
doubleton bid, the bundle value is the sum of the two item values plus the pair-
wise synergy value between them. The value of a bundle with bundle size> 2 
is computed as follows: 
IBI 
V~ == L vj + Synergy Value of Bundle B 
j=l 
JBI . 2 JBI . 
= L vj + (IBI- 1) L L syn'(j, k) 
J=l J=l k<J 
== IBI *Average Item Value in B 
+ IBI *Average Pairwise Synergy Value in B 
(2.2) 
This model is very efficient ( 0 ( n 2)); furthermore-, V~ possesses the desirable 
trait that it does not have a bias for large bundles over small bundles or vice 
versa (it increases, on average, linearly in the bundle size). 
Motivated by some common practices on transportation auctions and the 
synergy valuation model mentioned above, they proposed two bundle strate-
gies: Internal-Based Strategy (INT) and Competition-Based Strategy (COMP). 
INT generates bundles for bidder i as follows: 
For each item j EM: 
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(1) Create a single-item bundle B{ == j. Set nj==1. 
(2) Set B == B~j . Define k == arg maxzEM-B ACku{l} ' 
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(3) If ACku{k} > AC:k, then B~j+l == B U {k}, nj == nj + 1, and go to (2). 
This bundle creation algorithm starts from each individual item and searches 
for items to add to the current bundle B to increase the average unit contri-
bution (AC) of the bundle. If such an item can be found, the item which 
increases the AC the most is added, i.e. , set B == B U { k}. This process is 
repeated until the bundle's AC cannot be increased further. The bidder may 
submit some or all of the generated bundles , depending on whether or not the 
auctioneer put a limit on the maximum number of bundle bids allowed per 
bidder. 
Competition-Based Strategy (COMP) focuses on identifying bundles for 
which a bidder has a relatively high valuation compared with his competitors. 
COMP is very similar to INT, except that the criterion for adding an item to 
a bundle is the value ratio of bidder i for bundle B(V Rk) instead of the AC:k , 
where 
i V~ d - i 1 L q V RB == . an v . == v . ~ v - t 1 m -1 t 
L..ijEB j q#i 
(2.3) 
In other words, bidders using COMP bid on bundles for which they have 
higher ratios of valuations to their competitors ', according to their prior esti-
mations. 
Through simulations, they show that wise bidders using these two strategies 
outperform naive bidders , who only submit single-item bids. In addition, they 
draw some conclusions on the price strategy for the agent , e.e. when to bid 
aggressively (uses a higher price). 
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2.2.3 Schwind's Strategies 
Schwind et al. [41] attempt to solve the computational resource allocation 
problem with the multi-round combinatorial auctions. They study the situ-
ation where bidders use virtual currencies, which are obtained by selling idle 
resources, to get accesses to computational resources needed for accomplishing 
their own tasks. 
Based on K wasnica's work which computes the shadow price using the 
dual problem of the linear programming in equation 2.1, they calculate the 
market value of a resource unit by using the shadow price and summarizing 
the utilized capacity of each resource for all accepted bids: 
- ~ Spj. Cj\-1. M 
Vj - V J E 
Cj 
(2.4) 
where spj is the shadow price of a single unit of resource j. 
In general bid prices are not assumed to be linear in this framework, which 
means that shadow prices spj cannot be calculated by the auctioneer for each 
round. In such cases the auctioneer relies on an approximation of the market 
values based on historic data Hsp(j) which contains the market values calcu-
lated in the last n rounds: 
(2.5) 
Depending on the market value Vj of the resources, the bidder i calculates 
the bundle price as follows: 
_ { BGinij(T · N) if round= 1 
Pi(T) -
""'m t inc th . L...,.j=l Vj · j ·Pi o erw1se 
(2.6) 
If a bid is rejected, the bidder increases his price Pi (T) by adjusting p~nc as 
follows: 
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(2.7) 
where li is the round of the bid and ~p is the multiplier increment. 
The profit function of an agent is defined by: 
(xi(T) · ~~1 tjy~ 
ui(T) = (li(T) )!3 (2.8) 
Using the profit function they propose bidding strategies for two different 
agent types: (1) the quantity maximizing bidder with a = 0.5 and f3 = 0.01 
and (2) the impatient bidder with a= 0.5 and {3 = 1.0. 
• A quantity maximizing bidder tries to acquire a high amount of resource 
capacity. The hypothesis is that this agent follows the strategy of only 
increasing the bid prices slowly. The economic rationale for this type of 
proxy agent strategy could be the fact, that it bids for resources required 
for the fulfillment of a task that is not time-critical. A plausible strategy 
for the bidders is then trying to acquire the required resource capacity 
bundles at low market values using bids with slightly increasing bidding 
pr1ces. 
• An impatient bidder suffers if he can not use the resources instanta-
neously and will use an aggressive bidding strategy. This agent has to 
submit high initial prices, but overpaying will reduce the quantity he can 
acquire. Moreover, they analyze if a fast inclining pricing strategy can 
help to further increase the profit of this agent. The economic motiva-
tion of this behavior can be a proxy agent that bids for the execution 
of time-critical tasks in a provisioning system. The proxy agents have 
to bid for prompt fulfillment of the resource usage tasks. Therefore it is 
useful for proxy agents to quickly raise their bids to market level. 
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2.2.4 Wilenius's Strategy 
Based on Sureka's work [43], Wilenius et al. [47] present a new method for find-
ing approximate equilibrium strategies for the first-price multi-round sealed-
bid combinatorial auction with a general number of bidders and items. 
They first make the following observation that in a combinatorial auction, 
the probability for a bidder to win is a function of the size and value of the 
combinatorial bid, but independent of exactly which items are included in the 
combination. This means that given the size of a bundle, the winning probabil-
ity is only a function of bid value, no matter which items are contained in the 
bundle. The bidder 's strategy is derived from the expected profit based on an 
estimate of the probability function Ps ( x) , the probability that a combination 
of size s and bid-value x wins. 














Bidding price _ 
The estimated probability Ps ( x) is constructed by means of sampling the 
corresponding win-probability for a number of evenly spaced bid-values in the 
interval [0 , v(T)]. The probability is sampled by solving a number of auctions, 
in each auction bidders submit bids according to their current best response 
strategies. Figure 2.1 is a hypothetical sampled probability function, that 
is the data before any model is fitted. The figure illustrates two important 
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properties: one is the point labeled A, where all bids smaller than A w1n 
with probability 0, and the second is labeled point B after which the winning 
probability is always 1.0 which implies that any bid larger than B always wins. 
After the sampling, the following three models were used when fitting Pi ( x) 
to the sampled data, and the model with the smallest squared error is chosen. 
The variables a, b and c are determined during the regression procedure and 
are regarded as constants after the model has been selected. 
• Sigmod: ~ (X) = l+e-~<x-b) 
• Gaussian· P ·(x) = _a_ . e-~((x-c)/b)2 
• ~ b-/2TI-
• Exponential: ~(x) = axbec(x) 
After choosing the probability function, the bidder will bid the price that 
will maximize his expected profit Ps ( x) · ( v (T) - x), where Ps ( x) is chosen 
estimation function and v(T) is his valuation for bundle T. 
Through simulations, their heuristic is evaluated using two different inde-
pendently and uniformly distributed valuation models, one very general model 
where bidders bid on all combinations and one restricted model where bidders 
bid on one specific combination and single bids on the remaining items. A 
statistical comparison of auction revenue, profit and allocation efficiency com-
pared to the generalized VCG mechanism show that the co1nbinatorial auction 
using their strategies give slightly higher revenue and near optimal efficiency 
while sustaining minute loss of profit. 
2.2.5 Overview of Previous Strategies 
In this section, we will give an overview of these previous strategies on com-
binatorial auctions, and outline their differences with the adaptive strategies 
proposed in this work. 
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Table 2.1 shows an overview of previous strategies. Here the quasi-linear 
model is a profit model widely adopted in auction literatures, which will be 
introduced at the beginning of Chapter 3. 
Table 2.1 An overview of previous strategies 
Bundle Price Quasi -linear Single-round 
Strategy Strategy Model or Multi-round 
[Berhault, 2003] y N N/A Single-round 
[An, 2005] y y y Single-round 
[Schwind, 2006] N y N Multi-round 
(Wilenius, 2007] N y y Multi-round 
Berhault's work differentiates with ours in two aspects. First, they consider 
the cooperative environment in which the information sharing is possible to 
ensure better system performance while we study the competitive environment 
where each agent is self-interested and no communication exists, which is a 
widely study case in the literatures of game theory. Second, their work focus 
on the bundle strategy that guides the agent how to choose the resource bundles 
to bid, and, the price strategy that how much to bid for each bundle is not 
addressed. However, the adaptive strategy we propose in this paper is a price 
strategy and does not involve the bundle strategy. 
An's work focuses on both bundle strategy and price strategy. The most 
biggest difference with ours is that the proposed strategy is restricted to certain 
types of markets and is not adaptive, which means it may result in a poor 
performance when the market type changes. Similarly, Schwind's strategy 
is also not adaptive that the bidder's decision is independent on the current 
market environment and what 's more the proposed strategy is only verified on 
two types of bidders mentioned above: the quantity maximizing bidder and 
the impatient bidder. Another difference is that, their strategy is based on a 
profit model different with the quasi-linear model used in this work, which is 
widely adopted in literatures of auction theory. 
Wilenius's work is the most relative one with ours among these previous 
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strategies that it can achieve nearly the same performances with ours in some 
situations. 1 However, their strategy, which can help to produce approximate 
equilibrium with reasonable characteristics leading to overall good auction re-
sults, is based on a simplification of the bidding game: the valuation model 
is somewhat restricted and the generality is not guaranteed. In addition, the 
time for finding an equilibrium is extremely long: the auctioneer needs to re-
peat the auction for tens of thousands of round before such an equilibrium is 
found. However, in our adaptive strategies, the bidder can quickly adapt to 
the current market environment, either static or dynamic, which will be shown 
in the experiment section of each chapter. 
1 Actually, their method can be regarded as a kind of learning and will lead to similar 
performance in static markets. However, things change in dynamic markets because their 
method needs a so long time for training that the bidder using their strategy cannot catch 
up with the dynamics of the markets . 
Chapter 3 
An Adaptive Bidding Strategy 
in Static Markets 
As described in the above section, each winner needs to pay the price he has 
bid to get resources, and each loser pays nothing. The quasi-linear model is 
used: 
{ 




where ui(T), vi(R) and Pi(T) are his winning profit, his valuation, and his 
bidding price for bundle T respectively. 
When putting a bid on a resource bundle, a rational bidder will use a 
positive value which is less than his valuation for that bundle, otherwise he will 
get a negative profit when winning. That is to say, if the valuation of bidder i 
for bundle T is vi ( T) , then his bidding price Pi ( T) is Pi ( T) = ( 1 - pmi) x vi ( T), 
where 0 < pmi < 1. We refer to pmi here as bidder i 's profit margin. Combined 
with equation 3.1, the profit of bidder i is hence: 




Now, there is a dilemma faced by a bidder on deciding what profit margin 
to use when bidding for resource bundles: bidding with a low profit margin 
21 
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will increase his winning probability, but decreases his winning profit at the 
same time; bidding with a high profit margin will lead to a high winning profit , 
but under a high risk of losing. If a bidder is able to get some prior knowledge 
about the market environment, e.g., the ratio of supplies and demands, he may 
probably use these information to help his decision. For example, a bidder 
who has prior knowledge about the market that the there are more supplies of 
resources than demands will use a high profit margin when bidding. This is 
because in this kind of market, competitions for resources among bidders are 
not severe and bidding with a high profit margin will lead to a high winning 
profit while the probability of winning is almost unaffected. However , having 
prior knowledge is not always possible in a real market, because each bidder 
is self-interested and generally unwilling to share information with others who 
are also competing for resources. Our aim here is to design an adaptive bidding 
strategy such that the bidder adopting this strategy can perceive and responds 
to the static markets in a timely way even with limited information, which is 
the main contribution of this work. 
3.1 Basic Concepts 
We first introduce some basic concepts used in the adaptive bidding strategy. 
Definition 1 A bidding record of a bid b for bidder i is a tuple of five elements 
brb = (Tb, vi(Tb), pmb, waitb, winb), where Tb is the requested bundle in b, vi(Tb) 
is i's valuation for Tb, pmb is the profit margin used by bidder i for bid b, waitb 
is the number of rounds the bidder has attempted bidding with bid b before it 
is accepted or dropped, and winb is an integer of 0 or 1 indicating the bidding 
result for b, that winb equals to 1 if b is finally accepted, otherwise 0. 
From the definition, we can see that the maximum value for waitb is T 
and the minimum value for it is 0. In the former case, the bidder keeps on 
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attempting for T rounds and finally dropped the bid, and in the latter case, the 
bid b is accepted at the first round when submitted by the bidder. In addition, 
the value of winb can also be inferred from the value of waitb, that winb == 0 
if and only if waitb == T. 
Definition 2 The bidding history of a bidder, which is denoted as bhP, is 
the sequence of the most recent p bidding records. However, we say that it 
is consistent if and only if all these p bidding records share the same profit 
margin. 
Suppose p > 1, every time when a bid is accepted or dropped, the bidding 
history is updated that the oldest bidding record is removed from the bidding 
history and the newest one is inserted into the bidding history. However, the 
bidding history is said to be consistent only when the all the containing bidding 
records use the same profit margin. If a bidder uses a fixed profit margin for 
all bidding records , then each history is consistent; if he never uses the same 
profit margin for two consecutive bidding records, then none of his bidding 
history is consistent. 
Definition 3 The profit index of a bidder i on a consistent bidding histoty 
chbP, which is denoted as up( cbhP), is defined as: 
( bhP) _ ~brbEcbhP Wlnb Up C - pmi X ___ ___;_ ___ _ ~brbEcbhP ( winb + waitb) (3.3) 
where cbhP is the consistent bidding history and pmi is the common profit 
margin used in this consistent bidding history. 
The reason that we do not use the bidder's accumulated profit directly is 
explained as follows. To make the bidder using this adaptive strategy adapt 
quickly, the length of a consistent bidding history p, can not be a large num-
ber. In such a case the accumulated profit of a bidder in a consistent bidding 
history highly depends the selected resource bundles, e.g. for some bundles 
Chapter 3 An Adaptive Bidding Strategy in Static Markets 24 
he may have higher utilities and for some others he may have lower utilities , 
which makes the comparison of accumulated utilities of two consistent bidding 
histories unfair. To avoid this, we compared the post-utilities instead of ac-
cumulated utilities of two consistent bidding histories, and change the profit 
margin of the bidder according to the comparison results, which is discussed 
in detail in the next section. 
3.2 The Core Algorithm 
We first introduce the basic idea of the adaptive strategy in static markets. 
Suppose there is a magic single-peak function u(x) that gets its maximum at 
the optimal profit margin pmopt, which is the profit margin that maximizes 
the bidder's accumulated profit in the long term run. At the beginning, the 
bidder's profit margin is pm1, which is shown in figure 3.l .(a). After a few 
rounds, the bidder increases his profit margin by step and uses a new profit 
margin of pm2 , which is shown in figure 3.l.(b). Because u(x) gets its max-
imum at pmopt, so u(pm2 ) > u(pm1 ). The bidder will continue to increase 
his profit margin by step and use a new profit margin of pm3, which is shown 
in figure 3.l.(c). Now, suppose that u(pm2) > u(pm3), which means that 
pm1 < pmopt < pm3, the the bidder will make an opposite move of the profit 
margin but with step/2, and use a new profit margin of pm4 as shown in figure 
3.l.(d). Similarly, u(pm4 ) > u(pm3), and the bidder will continue to decrease 
his profit margin by step/2 and use the profit margin of pm2 as shown in figure 
3.l.(e). Now suppose u(pm4 ) > u(pm2 ) , which means pm2 < pmopt < pm3 , the 
bidder will make an opposite move with step/ 4 and use a new profit margin 
of pm5 . This process is repeated and the new generated profit margin will 
approach pmopt more and more. 
Based on the basic concepts and the heuristic described above, we illustrate 
the adaptive strategy as follows. The general idea is that every time when a 
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Figure 3.1 The basic idea of the adaptive strategy in static markets 
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new consistent bidding history is formed, the profit margin used by the bidder 
is increased or decreased according to the bidder 's 1st and 2nd most recent 
consistent bidding histories. The new profit margin is used by the bidder 
when he bids in the subsequent rounds before the next consistent bidding 
history is formed. This process is referred to as an adaptation of the profit 
margin. Through adaptations , the profit margin used will converge to the 
optimal profit margin. 
We refer to the increase and decrease of the profit margin as a positive 
and negative adjustment respectively, and use a 1 or -1 variable 8 to indicate 
the previous adjustment of the profit margin: if ·8 == 1, then the previous 
adjustment is positive, otherwise negative. We use u and u' to denote the 
post-utilities of the 1st and the 2nd most recent consistent bidding histories. 
We also use pm to denote the current profit margin, and use pm' to denote 
t he profit margin before the previous adjustment. 
The adaptive strategy is illustrated in Algorithm 1. 
We first give a general view of two functions: DecreaseStep (line 7) and 
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Algorithm 1 The adaptive strategy in static markets 
1: pm== TJ, step== e, 6 == 1 and u' == 0. 
2: while auction does not finish do 
3: Use profit margin of pm to bid for the current round 
4: if a new consistent bidding history cbhP is formed 
and step > E then 
5: Compute up(cbhP). 
6: u == up(cbhP) and pm'== pm. 
7: DecreaseStep (); 
8: if u < u' then 
9: pm == pm - 6 x step 
10: else if u > u' then 
11: pm == pm+ 6 x step 
12: end if 
13: if pm > pm' then 
14: 6 == 1 
15: else if pm <pm' then 
16: 6 == -1 
17: end if 
18: u' == u 
19: ProfitMarginReset (); 
20: end if 
21: end while 
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ProfitMarginReset (line 19) before the adaptive strategy is illustrated. Func-
tion DecreaseStep will decrease the value of step by a degree of r if certain 
conditions hold. The reason that we need such a decrease is to make the new 
generated profit margin further approach to the optimal one. The function 
ProfitMarginReset tries to reset the value of pm according to recent consistent 
bidding histories when it deviates from the optimal one. We will introduce 
them later in the paper. 
The adaptive strategy can be explained as follows. At the beginning, pm, 
step, 6 and u' are initialized. During the process of the auction , the value of 
pm is used by the bidder to bid in the auction, and is changed every time 
when a new consistent bidding history is formed. On deciding how to change 
this value, the bidder first computes the profit index of the newly formed 
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consistent bidding history, which is denoted by up ( cbhP), record this value in 
u , and then changes the profit margin according to the value of 8 and the 
relationship between u and u' (line 8-12). If the previous adjustment of the 
profit margin, which is recorded by 8, leads to a decrease of the profit index, 
an opposite adjustment will be made (line 8-9) , otherwise, a same adjustment 
will be made (line 10-11). An opposite adjustment means that the previous 
and next adjustment of the profit margin are different , e.g. , one is positive and 
the other is negative, and a same adjustment means that both the previous 
and next adjustment are positive or negative. The value of pm is changed from 
time to time in the auction and will gradually converge because of the decrease 
of step. The adaptation is stopped when step is smaller than a threshold E and 
the bidder use the profit margin at that time for all subsequent rounds until 
the auction finishes. 
Next, we will describe the two functions in the adaptive strategy in detail: 
DecreaseStep and ProfitMarginReset. 
Function of DecreaseStep 
From Algorithm 1, we can see that the bidder using this strategy will change 
his profit margin every p bidding records , according to the value of two post-
utilities. Go through the definition, we can see that the second term is actually 
the winning probability of the bidder using the profit margin of pmi when p 
is large enough. So if we refer to Pwin(Pmi) as th~ winning probability, then 
the larger the value of p is , generally the closer to Pwin (pm) the second term 
is. However , as we have mentioned above, the value of p cannot be set to a 
large value because the bidder also needs to adapt to the environment in a 
timely manner. By such constraint , the second term can be only regarded as 
an approximation of the winning probability. Thereby, we say that the second 
term is vulnerable to noise and the profit index is inaccurate when p is small. 
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We need an algorithm that is robust against noise to decide when to de-
crease step. Before it is introduced, the concept of profit margin history is 
defined as the notion of go towards is given. 
Definition 4 A profit margin history, which is denoted as pmh, is a sequence 
of A real numbers, in which the kth element, pmhk, is the profit margin used 
for the kth most recent consistent bidding history. 
Notation 1 We also give the notion of "go towards" as follows. The profit 
margin pm is said to go towards a value 1r, denoted as pm ~ 1r if 1) pm< 1r and 
the next adjustment for pm is positive or 2) pm> 1r and the next adjustment 
for pm is negative. 
Algorithm 2 Function: DecreaseStep 
1: Compute mean== t ~~=1 pmhk. 
2: for k == 0 to A do 
3: if lpmhk - meanl < step then 
4: wk == 1 
5: else 
6: wk == 0 
7: end if 
8: end for 
9: if ~~=l wk > cp 
and w1 == 1 
and pm goes towards mean then 
10: Decrease step by r 
11: end if 
The function of DecreaseStep is given in Algorithm 2. On whether or not to 
decrease the value of step, the bidder first computes mean, the mean value of 
elements in pmh. Second, for each element in the profit margin history, there 
is a variable wk that indicates whether it is not step far away from mean: if 
yes then w equals to 1, otherwise 0 (line 2-8) . Finally, the value of step is 
decreased by r if all the three conditions are satisfied. The first condition 
L:~=l wk. > cp guarantees that the profit margins in pmh fluctuate around 
Chapter 3 An Adaptive Bidding Strategy in Static Markets 29 
mean, in which case the value of mean is regarded as an approximation of 
the optimal profit margin. The second condition that w 1 == 1 and the third 
condition that pm => mean together guarantee that the optimal profit margin 
can be further approached in the next adaptation if step is decreased. 
Our illustration for the function of DecreaseStep is as follows. As mentioned 
above , the second term is vulnerable to noise and thus makes the profit index 
inaccurate. If we still use the way described in section 3.1 , the new generated 
profit margin maybe converges to a suboptimal one. One possible solution 
is to view the adaptation of the profit margin as a random event: although 
sometimes the new generated profit margin can deviate from the optimal one, 
generally it will go towards the optimal one. By this consideration, the profit 
margin history is checked before the value of step is decreased. 
Function of ProfitMarginReset 
Just as the name implies, this function tries to reset the profit margin if it 
deviates too much from the optimal one. The reason for such a deviation can 
be explained as follows . From Algorithm 1, we can see that given 6, the next 
adjustment of the profit margin is determined by the relationship between u 
and u' . However , when step is small , this relationship mainly depends on the 
differences of the second term of the profit index, which is vulnerable to noise 
as mentioned above. Thus, it is quite possible that the bidder consecutively 
makes wrong decisions on adaptation and makes _ the profit margin deviate 
from the optimal one. 
However , the profit margin should not be reset all the time. For example, if 
t he profit margin has been consecutively reset from higher or lower values for 
certain times, then it is quite possible that the value, which the profit margin is 
reset to, is not close to the optimal one. This corresponds to our common sense 
that if we always get wrong answers to a problem with a solution, we tend to 
believe that the solution itself may be improper and needs to be corrected. 
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Before we describe the function of ProfitMarginReset condition, the nota-
tion of deviate from and the concept of profit margin history center is given as 
follows. 
Notation 2 We also give the notion of "deviate from" as follows. The profit 
margin pm is said to deviate from a value 1r, denoted as pm -=!} 1r if 1) pm< 
1r and the next adjustment for pm is negative or 2) pm> 1r and the next 
adjustment for pm is positive. 
Definition 5 The cent er of a profit margin history cenpmh, is the mean value 
of elements in pmh if the condition that 2::::~= 1 wk>cjJ in line 9 of Algorithm 2 
is satisfied, otherwise, it does not exist. Which means: 
{ t 2:::~= 1 pmhk if 2:::~= 1 wk > cjJ cenpmh == null otherwise (3.4) 
We use cen' to denote the most recent center of the profit margin history, 
and use resz and resh to denote the number of times that the profit margin is 
consecutively reset from lower and higher values respectively. 
The function of ProfitMarginReset is described in Algorithm 3. 
The algorithm can be explained as follows. First , the bidder computes the 
difference between pm and cen'. If the absolute value of this difference is more 
than 1/J x step, it is regarded that the profit margin has deviated too much 
from the optimal one. Values of resz and resh are updated according to the 
value of d (lines 4 and 11). If the upper bound of consecutively reset time 
x has not been reached, the profit margin is reset to cen', the most recent 
approximation of the optimal profit margin (lines 6 and 13). Otherwise, it is 
regarded that this approximation is inappropriate, in which case it is replaced 
by pm (lines 8 and 15). 
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Algorithm 3 Function: ProfitMarginReset 
1: Computed== pm- cen'. 
2: if ldl > 1/J x step then 
3: if d>O then 
4: Set resz == 0 and resh == resh + 1. 
5: if resh < X then 
6: Set pm == cen' 
7: else 
8: Set cen' ==pm and resh == 0. 
9: end if 
10: else 
11: Set resh == 0 and resz == resz + 1 
12: if resz < X then 
13: Set pm == cen' 
14: else 
15: Set cen' == pm and resz == 0. 
16: end if 
17: end if 
18: end if 
3.3 Experimental Evaluation 
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To evaluate the performance of the adaptive strategy in static markets, two sets 
of experiments are conducted. In the first set of experiments, the performances 
of different fixed strategies are compared in different markets in order to find 
out the best fixed strategy. A fixed strategy is a strategy in which a same 
profit margin is used by the bidder during the whole process of the auction. In 
the second set of experiments, the performances of the random strategy (RS), 
the adaptive strategy (AS) and the best fixed strategy (BFS) are compared. 
The random strategy is a strategy that a random profit margin is used for each 
bidding record. The best fixed strategy is the fixed strategy that generates the 
highest profit among all fixed strategies used in the first set of experiments. 
We refer to the best fixed profit margin as the the profit margin used by the 
best fixed strategy. In addition, we also show the typical adaptation process 
of the profit margin in a single run in different markets. 
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3.3.1 Experiment Setup 
In our experiments, each combinatorial auction is repeated for 500 rounds and 
an iteration of 500 rounds is referred to as a run. Motivated by other works 
[1 ][41], in each run, we use the single-agent model in the experiments, in which 
there is only one test bidder using strategy X and others bidding their true 
valuations. Here, X can be the adaptive strategy, the random strategy or any 
fix strategy. The performances of different strategies are compared through 
accumulated utilities of the test bidder in a static market in 100 runs. The 
reason that multiple runs are used is that we want to eliminate the uncertainty 
brought by the random initialization of the valuations of the bundles. 
Settings of these experiments are as follows. A group of users are compet-
ing for m === 4 types of resources with capacities of 90, 60, 60, 30 respectively 
provided by a resource provider. For each bidder, numbers of units that he can 
request for different resources are integers randomly drawn from uniform distri-
butions of [0, 3], [0 , 2], [0, 2] and [0 , 1] respectively, which means dj === 3, 2, 2, 1 
for j === 1, 2, 3, 4. 
At the beginning of each run, each bidder initializes his valuations for all 
resource bundles. His valuations for single unit of different resources are real 
numbers randomly drawn from uniform distributions of [3 , 6], [4, 8], [4 , 8] 
and [6, 10] respectively. For a resource bundle T , which contains more than 
one type of resource, the valuation is generated as follows: there is a synergy 
seed syn(T) which is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution of [-0.2 , 0.2] , 
and his valuation for that bundle is the product of sum valuations of individual 
resources and 1 + syn(T), which means: 
m 
vi(T) === (L Vj · tj) x (1 + syn(T)) 
j=l 
(3.5) 
where positive synergy seed means there are complementarities among re-
sources and negative synergy seed means there are substitutabilities among 
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them. 
In our settings, because the capacities of resources are fixed, we use different 
numbers of bidders participating in the auction to denote different market 
environments. Here, a ratio factor r f is used to denote a market type: if 
the ratio of total supplies and demands in the market is equals to 1 : r f, we 
say that this is a 1 : r f market. For example, when the number of bidders 
n ~ 60, the total supplies and expected demands are equal, so in this case, 
we say that the market is a 1 : 1 market. In the experiments, we use four 
values of n == 30, 40, 50 and 60 respectively to denote the 1 : 0. 75, 1 : 1, 
1 : 1.25 and 1 : 1.5 market respectively, which means that our simulations 
has comprehensively considered different market types, e.g. supplies are more 
than demands, supplies are nearly equal to demands and supplies are less than 
demands. 
Parameters used in the experiments are explained in Table 3 .1. 
Table 3.1 Parameters used in simulations of the adaptive strategy in static 
markets 
Parameter Value Description 
T 3 Maximum attempting round 
p 5 Length of a bidding history 
'17 0.05 Initial value of pm 
() 0.1 Initial value of step 
E 0.01 Threshold for step to stop adaptation 
A 10 Length of a profit margin history 
c/J 6 ·See Algorithm 2 and Definition 6 
' 
2 Degree of decre~se for step 
1/J 3 See Algorithm 3 
X 3 Maximum consecutive reset time 
3.3.2 Experiment Results and Analysis 
In the first set of experiments, we try to find out the best fixed strategy with a 
family of fix strategies. We have 10 different fixed strategies in the family, and 
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for the kth strategy, the profit margin of pmk is used by the test bidder during 
the whole 100 runs, where pmk = (k- 1) x 0.1 + 0.05 fork= 1, 2, ... , 10. We 
compute the accumulated profit of the test bidder using different strategies, 
find out the best fixed strategy and refer to the profit margin used by that 
strategy as the best fixed profit margin. 





















Figure 3.2 shows the results of the this set of experiments. In the figure, 
from top to bottom, four curves represent the market type of 1 : 0. 75 , 1 : 1, 
1 : 1.25 and 1 : 1.5 respectively, and for each market type, the accumulated 
utilities of the test bidder using 10 different fixed strategies are marked as dots 
on that line. From the figure, we can see that for different market type, the best 
fixed profit margin is different: the more competitive the market is , the smaller 
the value of the best fixed profit margin is. For example, in the 1 : 0. 75 market , 
where bidders face few competitions from others, the best fixed profit margin 
is 0.95, and in the 1 : 1.5 market, where bidders face fierce competitions from 
others, the best fixed profit margin is 0.25. This corresponds to our common 
sense that it is better for a bidder to use different profit margins in different 
markets: in a market that is short of competition, it is better for a bidder 
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to use a high profit margin to obtain a high profit, while in a market that is 
highly competitive, it is better for a bidder to use a low profit margin to beat 
others. 
In the second set of experiments, we compare the accumulated utilities of 
the test bidder using the random strategy, the adaptive strategy and the best 
fixed strategy. The random strategy is a strategy that a random profit margin 
is used for each bidding record. The best fixed strategy is the fixed strategy 
that generates the highest profit among all fixed strategies used in the first set 
of experiments. Note that in the first set of experiments, the maximum profit 
margin that the bidder can use in the fixed strategy is 0.95 , so to make the 
comparison fair, we also set up the same upper bound of 0.95 for the random 
strategy and the adaptive strategy. 1 
Figure 3.3 shows the results of this set of experiments. Here, RS corre-
sponds to the random strategy, AS corresponds to the adaptive strategy, and 
BFS corresponds to the optimal fixed strategy. From the figure, we can see 
that the adaptive strategy performs fairly well when compared to the best 
fixed strategy, and outperforms the random strategy much in different market 
environments. As described above, the best fixed strategy is the strategy that 
performs best among all fixed strategies, so bidder using the best fixed strategy 
should be regarded as having prior knowledge about the market environment 
and is able to use the best fixed profit margin to obtain a high profit. On the 
contrary, the bidder using the random strategy can_ be regarded as not having 
any prior knowledge about the market and will use a random profit margin 
for every bidding record. Therefore, it is impressive that the bidder using the 
adaptive strategy, can still obtain utilities that is about 90% compared to the 
1 Actually, setting this upper bound does not affect the performance of the adaptive 
strategy. This is because without this constraint, when the optimal profit margin is a value 
infinitely close to 1, the profit margin generated by the adaptive strategy is also very close 
to 1, and the bidder using the adaptive strategy does not losing profit at all. 
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utilities obtained by the bidder using the best fixed strategy in different mar-
ket environments. As the bidder using the adaptive strategy does not need to 
know the market type in advance, we can draw the conclusion that the per-
formance of the adaptive strategy is good, even without any prior knowledge 
about the market. 
In addition, we also show the typical adaptation processes of the profit 
margin in a single run in different markets. For each type of market , the 
horizontal line represents the best fixed profit margin in that type of market. 
From Figure 3.4, we can see that for each type of market , the profit margin 
in the adaptive strategy has finally converged to a value, which is very close 
to the best fixed profit margin in that market type. This means that the 
adaptive strategy is capable of adapting in different markets. In addition, 
the convergence speed is fast: for each market type, t he profit margin has 
converged at about the 150th round and a profit margin t hat is very close 
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Figure 3.4 The typical adaptation process of the profit margin in a single run 
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to the best fixed one is reached. (If we consider the case of "close to", the 
situation is even better: the profit margin generated by the adaptive strategy 
is closed to the best fixed one at about 50th round). This profit margin is used 
by the bidder to bid in subsequent rounds, which guarantees that the adaptive 
strategy can generate a very good profit when compared to both the best fixed 
strategy and the random strategy. 
Chapter 4 
An Adaptive Bidding Strategy 
in Dynamic Markets 
In the previous chapter, we have introduced an adaptive strategy in static 
markets. In this section, we will introduce the adaptive strategy in dynamic 
markets. We continue to use the quasi-linear model: 




where ui(T) , vi(R) and Pi(T) are his winning profit , his valuation, and his 
bidding price for bundle T respectively. 
When putting a bid on a resource bundle, a rational bidder will use a 
positive value which is less than his valuation for that bundle, otherwise he will 
get a negative profit when winning. That is to say, if the valuation of bidder i 
for bundle T is vi(T), then his bidding price Pi(T) is Pi(T) == (1- pmi) x vi (T ), 
where 0 < pmi < 1. We refer to pmi here as bidder i 's profit margin. Combined 
with equation 4.1 , the profit of bidder i is hence: 




The bidder faces the same dilemma as he does in static markets on how 
much to bid for a resource bundle: bidding with a low profit margin will 
38 
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increase his winning probability, but decreases his winning profit at the same 
time; bidding with a high profit margin will lead to a high winning profit, 
but under a high risk of losing. The self-interestedness of the bidder makes 
this decision problem more complex: no one is willing to share his information 
with others about the knowledge of the markets with may put him self in an 
inferior position when competing for resources. In addition, there are two more 
challenges in dynamic markets than in static markets: 1) the bidder needs to 
behave more timely in the dynamic markets than in static markets. 2) the 
history information is no more reliable because the dynamics of the markets, 
which means the available information in dynamic markets is even less than 
in static markets. Our aim here is to design an adaptive bidding strategy 
such that the bidder adopting this strategy can perceive and respond to the 
dynamic markets in a timely way even with limited information, which is the 
main contribution of this work. 
4.1 Basic Concepts 
In order to explain the adaptive bidding strategy, we first introduce some basic 
concepts. 
Definition 6 A bidding record of a bid b for bidder i is a tuple of five elements 
brb == (Tb , vi(Tb) ,pmb , waitb , wirib) , where Tb is the requested bundle in b, vi(Tb) 
is i's valuation of Tb , pmb is i 's profit margin for bid b, waitb is the number of 
rounds the bidder has attempted bidding with bid b before it is accepted or 
dropped, and winb is a integer of 0 or 1 denoting the bidding result of bid b. 
If winb== 1, then b is finally accepted, otherwise it is dropped. 
The minimum value of waitb is 0, when the bidder wins the requested 
bundle at t he first round after submission, and the maximum value is 1, when 
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he keeps on attempting for T rounds and finally drops the bid. Note that 
winb==O if and only if waitb==T. 
Definition 7 The profit index of a bidding record brb, denoted as Ubr(brb), is 
defined as: 
(4.3) 
Definition 8 The bidding history of a bidder, denoted as bhP, is the sequence 
of recent p bidding records. 
The bidding history varies from time to time. Every time when a bid is 
accepted or dropped, a new bidding record is formed and the bidding history 
is updated: the oldest bidding record is removed from the bidding history and 
the newest bidding record is inserted into the bidding history. The definition 
is also the same as the one defined in the previous chapter. 
Because of the dynamics of the market, information contained in a new 
bidding record is more valuable than that contained in a old one, e.g. the old 
bidding history is generated some time ago and therefore can not represent the 
current market environment. To model this, we define the age of a bidding 
record and a weight function on age. 
Definition 9 We define the age of a bidding record brb as the number of times 
that the bidding history is updated, since the first time that brb is inserted into 
the bidding history. 
For any bidding record, the minimum age value can be 0, in which case it 
is the newest one that is inserted into the bidding history and that bidding 
history has not been updated since its insertion. The maximum age of a 
bidding record can be infinite large theoretically, however, as the length of 
bidding history is p, the maximum age of a bidding record which is current 
contained in the bidding history is p - 1, in which case it is the oldest one in 
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the bidding history and to be removed when a new bidding record is generated. 
So if the age of a bidding record is no less than A, then it is not contained in 
the bidding history. 
Definition 10 A weight function is a decreasing function on the age of a 
bidding record that w : N ---+ [0, 1]. 
The function value of a bidding record represents how important the in-
formation contained in that bidding record is. The newer the bidding record 
is , the more representative it is of the current market environment and the 
higher the function value is. A possible implementation of the weight function 
is illustrated in Figure 4.1. In this implementation, the weight of the newest 
bidding record is 1 and the weight of a bidding record whose age is no less than 
A is 0. Combined with definition 4, we can see that the weight of a bidding 
record is positive if and only if it is contained in the bidding history. Of course, 
there are many other possible implementations of the weight function , if the 
conditions in the definitions are satisfied. 
Figure 4.1 A possible implementation of the weight function 
0 Age of a bidding record p 
Definition 11 The profit index of a bidding history bhP, denoted as ubh(bhP), 
is the weighted average post-utilities of bidding records in that bidding history. 
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That is to say: 
(4.4) 





So, ubh(bhPI>a) is the weighted average post-utilities of the bidding records 
1n the bidding history whose profit margin is greater than or equal to a , 
and similarly ubh(bhPI?.a) is the weighted average post-utilities of the bidding 
records in the bidding history whose profit margin is smaller than or equal 
to a. These two notations are used in the adaptive strategy, which will be 
discussed in the following section. 
4.2 The Core Algorithm 
We first introduce the basic idea of the adaptive strategy in dynamic markets. 
Suppose there is a magic single-peak function u(x) that gets its maximum at 
the optimal profit margin pmopt, which is the profit margin that maximizes 
the bidder's accumulated profit in the long term run. At the beginning, the 
bidder's profit margin is pm1 , which is shown in figure 3.l.(a). After a few 
rounds , the bidder increases his profit margin by step and uses a new profit 
margin of pm2 , which is shown in figure 3 .1. (b). Because u ( x ) gets its max-
imum at pmopt , so u(pm2 ) > u(pm1 ). The bidder will continue to increase 
his profit margin by step and use a new profit margin of pm3 , which is shown 
in figure 3.l.(c). Now, suppose that u(pm2 ) > u(pm3 ) , which means that 
Chapter 4 An Adaptive Bidding Strategy in Dynamic Markets 43 
pm 1 < pmopt < pm3, the the bidder will make an opposite move of the profit 
margin but with step/2 , and use a new profit margin of pm4 as shown in figure 
3.l .(d) . Similarly, u(pm4 ) > u(pm3), and the bidder will continue to decrease 
his profit margin by step /2 and use the profit margin of pm2 as shown in figure 
3.l.(e). Now suppose u(pm4 ) > u(pm2) , which means pm2 < pmopt < pm3, the 
bidder will make an opposite move with step/ 4 and use a new profit margin 
of pm5 . This process is repeated and the new generated profit margin will 
approach pmopt more and more. 
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Next , we illustrate the adaptive strategy based on the concepts and the 
heuristic described above. The basic idea is the same as that in static markets: 
the bidder keeps changing his profit margin from time to time , and always 
approaches to the optimal one in the current market environment to obtained a 
high profit , where the optimal profit margin refers to the profi t margin that will 
maximize t he bidder 's accumulated profit in the current market environment 
in a long-term run. However, a difference is that in static markets, the profit 
margin is changed every bidding history and in dynamic markets, this value is 
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changed every bidding record. Actually, the latter scenario can be regarded as 
a special case of the former one, in which p == 1 in definition 2 such that each 
bidding record is a bidding history. 
As the same we do in static markets, we refer to the increase and decrease 
of the profit margin as a positive and negative adjustment respectively, and use 
a 1 or -1 variable 6 to indicate the previous adjustment of the profit margin: 
if 6 == 1, then the previous adjustment is positive, otherwise negative. In 
addition, we use u and u' to denote the post-utilities of the 1st and the 2nd most 
recent bidding records. We also use pm to denote the current profit margin, 
and use pm' to denote the profit margin before the previous adjustment. 
The adaptive strategy is illustrated in Algorithm 4. 
Functions CheckStepDecrease (line 7) and CheckStepincrease (line 8) will 
decrease and increase step by a degree of r respectively under some conditions. 
The reason that why we do not use a constant value for step is that if a small 
value is used, the bidder using the adaptive strategy may take a very long 
time to get to the new optimal profit margin when the market environment 
changes, and on the other hand if a large value is used, adaptation speed is 
guaranteed at the expense of the accuracy. We need to adjust the value of step 
dynamically during the process of the auction: we decrease the value of step 
with the hope that the profit margin generated by the adaptive strategy can 
be more accurate, and we increase the value of step to ensure that the profit 
margin can be adjusted quickly when market environment changes. We will 
describe them in detail later. 
The adaptive strategy can be explained as follows. At the beginning, vari-
ables are initialized (line 1). During the process of the auction, the bidder use 
pm as his profit margin to bid in the auction, and increase or decrease its value 
every time when a new bidding record is formed. The bidding record is used 
to update the bidding history and its profit index is computed (line 5). In the 
first case where both u and u' are 0, it is believed that the current profit margin 
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is so much high that it should be decreased by a certain degree (line 9-10). In 
the second case that neither u nor u' are not equal to 0, the profit margin is 
adjusted as follows: if the previous adjustment of the profit margin, which is 
recorded by 6, has led to a decrease of the profit index, an opposite adjustment 
will be made, otherwise, a same adjustment will be made (line 11-16). An op-
posite adjustment means that the previous and next adjustment are different, 
e.g. , one is positive and the other is negative, and a same adjustment means 
that both the previous and next adjustment are positive or negative. In the 
last case when only one of the two approximate utilities is 0, the bidder first 
computes ubh (bhP I~(/) and ubh (bhP I :SO") , and then make the decision according 
to their relationship. If the former is smaller than the latter , which means 
that decreasing the profit margin will obtain a higher average profit index, the 
bidder will make a negative move, otherwise the bidder will make a positive 
move (line 17-23). Finally, the move of the profit margin is recorded in 6 as 
the previous move and the value of u' is updated (line 25-30). 
Next , we will describe the two functions of CheckStepDecrease and Check-
Steplncrease in detail. 
Function of DecreaseStep 
As mentioned above, the value of step is decreased with the hope that the profit 
margin generated by the adaptive strategy can be further approached to the 
optimal one. However , from Algorithm 1, we can see that the bidder using this 
strategy will change his profit margin every bidding records according to the 
value of two post-utilities, whose second term is easily noised. Here, we say the 
second term is vulnerable to noise because that even a same profit margin used, 
their values can vary much, which should be close to each other theoretically. 
Therefore, we need an algorithm which is robust to noise for decreasing the 
value of step during the adaptation process of the profit margin. We first 
define two concepts and a notation. 
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Definition 12 The profit margin history, denoted as pmh, is a sequence of A 
numbers, in which the kth element pmhk, is the profit margin used for the kth 
most recent bidding record. 
Definition 13 The step history, which is denoted as sh, is a sequence of A 
numbers, in which the kth element, shk, is the value of step used when pmhk-I 
is adjusted to pmhk. 
Notation 5 We also give the notion of "go towards" . The profit margin pm 
is said to go towards a value 1r, which is denoted as pm => 1r if 1) pm<1r and 
the next adjustment for pm is positive or 2) pm>1r and the next adjustment 
for pm is negative. 
The function of DecreaseStep is given in Algorithm 5. At first, we compute 
the mean value of elements in pmh (line 1), then for each element we check 
the condition that whether the distance between pmhk and mean is no more 
than shk and use a 0 or 1 variable wk to indicate the result (line 2 to 7). On 
deciding whether to decrease the value of step, we check four conditions (line 
8): the first one checks whether at least cjJ elements in pmh are close to mean 
in terms of the value of step used at that time, by which we regard mean as 
an approximation of the optimal profit margin; the second and the third one 
together guarantee that the optimal profit margin can be further approached 
if step is decrease; and the last one ensures that the threshold value for step 
is not reached. If all four conditions holds, we decrease step by a degree of r 
(line 9). 
This function is quite similar as the one we described in Algorithm 2 in the 
previous chapter, which is used for static markets. However, two main points 
differentiate. The first one is that the value of step will not be decreased if its 
value is smaller than a threshold of a. Here, we add this condition because: 
1) The bidder's profit does not differentiate too much when using pm1 if pm2 
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if pm1 - pm2 < a and a is smaller enough, e.g. the bidder's profit is quite 
close when using 0.2 and 0.21 as profit margins, which is only 1% difference 
theoretically. In this case, approaching the optimal profit margin does not 
necessarily worths the computational cost brought by calling this function. 2) 
As we will discussed in the following section, the value of step is increased 
when the market environment changes. If the value of step is decreased too 
much, it will take a very long time for the bidder to adjust his profit margin 
to the optimal one, during which a lot of profit is lost. The second difference 
is that when computing the value of wk, we use the criteria of shk instead of 
step in algorithm 2. This is because that different with the adaptive strategy 
in static markets where the profit margin is adjusted every p bidding records, 
the profit margin in the adaptive strategy in dynamic markets is adjust every 
bidding record, in which case it will be not rational to use the same criteria 
to compute p because the values of step used for changing the profit margin 
from pmh.\ to pmh.\ -1 and pmh2 to pmh1 differentiate very much. Therefore, 
it will be more reasonable to use the value of step for the adjustment at that 
time. 
Function of IncreaseStep 
Besides decreasing the value of step when we want to further approach to 
the optimal profit margin, we also need to increase its value when the market 
environment changes with the hope that the new optimal profit margin can be 
quickly approached. 
The function of IncreaseStep is given in Algorithm 3. Here, we use two 
variables posM ove and ne gM ove to denote the number of positive and negative 
moves made in the profit margin history. We also use a variable of J to denote 
the next adjustment of the profit margin: if J == 1, then the next adjustment 
is positive, otherwise negative. At first, these two variables are initialized (line 
1). Then we traverse the profit margin history and check the past moves of the 
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profit margin (line 2 to 8). If the number of negative moves is greater than x 
and the next move is negative (first part of line 9), we believe that the market 
environment is becoming more competitive for resource consumers and the 
bidder should increase the value of step to adapt to the new market quickly. 
Similarly, if the number of positive moves is greater than x and the next move 
is positive (second part of line 9), we believe that the market environment 
is becoming less competitive for resource consumers and the bidder should 
decrease the value of step for adaptation. In either cases, if the threshold 
value for step f3 is not reached, we will increase step by a degree of 1 (line 10). 
4.3 Experimental Evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate our adaptive strategy through simulations. We 
compare the performances of the random strategy (RS), the adaptive strategy 
(AS) and the intelligent strategy (IS) in three types of dynamic market. The 
random strategy is a strategy that a random profit margin is used for each 
bidding record. The intelligent strategy is a strategy artificially generated 
according to prior knowledge about the market. In addition, we also show 
the typical adaptation process of the profit margin in a single run in different 
markets. 
Two sets of experiments are conducted in this section. In the first set of 
experiments, the performances of different fixed strategies are compared in 
different markets in order to find out the best fixed strategies, which are used 
to generate the intelligent strategy. A fix strategy is a strategy that a same 
profit margin is used by the bidder during the whole process of the auction. In 
the second set of experiments, the performances of the random strategy, the 
adaptive strategy and the intelligent strategy are compared. 
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4.3.1 Experiment Setup 
In our experiments, each combinatorial auction is repeated for 900 rounds and 
an iteration of 900 rounds is referred to as a run. Motivated by other works 
[1 ][41], in each run, we use the single-agent model in the experiments, in which 
there is only one test bidder using strategy X and others bidding their true 
valuations. Here, X can be the adaptive strategy, the random strategy or any 
fix strategy. The performances of different strategies are compared through 
accumulated utilities of the test bidder in a static market in 100 runs. The 
reason that multiple runs are used is that we want to eliminate the uncertainty 
brought by the random initialization of the valuations of the bundles. 
Settings of these experiments are as follows. A group of n == 60 users are 
competing for m == 4 types of resources with varying capacities provided by 
a resource provider. For each bidder, numbers of units that he can request 
for different resources are integers randomly drawn from uniform distributions 
of [0 , 3] , [0 , 2] , [0 , 2] and [0 , 1] respectively, which means dj == 3, 2, 2, 1 for 
j == 1, 2, 3, 4. 
At the beginning of each run, each bidder initializes his valuations for all 
resource bundles. His valuations for single unit of different resources are real 
numbers randomly drawn from uniform distributions of [3 , 6], [4 , 8] , [4, 8] 
and [6 , 10] respectively. For a resource bundle T , which contains more than 
one type of resource, the valuation is generated as follows: there is a synergy 
seed syn(T) which is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution of [-0.2 , 0.2], 
and his valuation for that bundle is the product of sum valuations of individual 
resources and 1 + syn(T) , which means: 
m 
vi (T) == (L Vj · tj) x (1 + syn(T)) 
j=l 
(4.7) 
where positive synergy seed means there are complementarities among re-
sources and negative synergy seed means there are substitutabilities among 
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them. 
Here, a ratio factor r f is used to denote a market type: if the ratio of total 
supplies and demands in the market is equals to r f : 1, we say that this is 
a r f : 1 market. For example, when the total supplies of different resources 
are 90, 60, 60 and 30 respectively, the total supplies and expected demands 
are equal, so in this case, we say that the market is a 1 : 1 market. In our 
experiments, because the expected total demands of resources from users are 
fixed, we simulate the dynamics of the market by varying the value of r f. 
This value is changed from time to time during the auction, which means that 
our simulations has comprehensively considered different market types , e.g. 
supplies are more than demands, supplies are nearly equal to demands and 
supplies are less than demands. 
Parameters used in the experiments are explained in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Parameters used in experiments of the adaptive strategy in dynamic 
markets 
Parameter Value Description 
T 3 Maximum attempting round 
A 5 Length of a bidding history 
TJ 0.05 Initial value of pm 
f) 0.1 Initial value of step 
' 
2 Degree of decrease or increase for step 
A 10 Length of a profit margin history 
<P 6 See Algorithm 5 
a 0.01 Threshold to stop decreasing step 
X 6 See Algorithm 6 
f3 0.1 Threshold to stop increasing step 
In addition, we used the weight function shown in Figure 4.1 in the exper-
iments. 
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4.3.2 Experiment Results and Analysis 
In the first set of experiments, we try to find out the optimal profit margins 
in different market environments with a family of fix strategies. We have 19 
different fixed strategies in the family, and for the kth strategy, the profit 
margin of pmk is used by the test bidder during the whole 100 runs, where 
pmk == k x 0.05 for k == 1, 2, ... , 19. For each market type, we compute the 
accumulated profit of the test bidder using different fixed strategies and find 
out the best fixed strategy which performs best among all fixed strategies. 























Figure 4.3 shows the results of the this set of experiments. In the figure, 
from top to bottom, each of the eight curves represent a market type from 
1.2 : 1 to 0.5 : 1 respectively, and for each market type, the accumulated 
utilities of the test bidder using 19 different fixed strategies are marked as dots 
on that line. From the figure, we can see that for different market types, the 
best fixed profit margin is different: the more competitive the market is, the 
smaller the value of the best fixed profit margin is. For example, in the 1.2 : 1 
market , where bidders face few competitions from others, the best fixed profit 
margin is 0.95, and in the 0.5 : 1 market, where bidders face fierce competitions 
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from others, the best fixed profit margin is 0.15. This corresponds to our 
common sense that it is better for a bidder to use different profit margins in 
different markets: in a market that is short of competition, it is better for a 
bidder to use a high profit margin to obtain a high profit, while in a market 
that is highly competitive, it is better for a bidder to use a low profit margin 
to beat others. 
Based on this result, the optimal profit margins in different market types 
are approximated as follows. Knowing the best fix profit margins for different 
market types, e.g. in the 0.5 : 1 market the best fixed profit margin is 0.15 and 
in the 1.2 : 1 market the best fixed profit margin is 0.95 , we use a regression 
method to model the optimal profit margin as a function with the ratio factor 
r f as the parameter, which is shown in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4 Estimation of the optimal profit margin 
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Each red point represent the best fixed profit margin in that market type, 
e.g. the red point (0. 7, 0.2) means that in the 0. 7 : 1 market, the fixed strategy 
that keeps the bidder using the profit margin of 0.2 performs best among all 
fixed strategies. We use a piecewise function pmopt ( r f) to fit the red points, 
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which is given by: 
{ 
a X br f + c r f < d 
pmopt(r f) == 
e rf > d 
53 
(4.8) 
The result of the regression is that a == 0.0001382, b == 2561.57 4, c == 0.1683, 
e == 0.95 and d == 1.109873, which is shown by the blue line in Figure 4.4. We 
can see that it fits the red points very well, and in the following, when talking 
about the optimal profit margin in the market type r f, we will use the function 
value as the approximate, which is how the intelligent strategy works. 1 
In the second set of experiments, we compare the accumulated utilities 
of the test bidder using the random strategy, the adaptive strategy and the 
intelligent strategy. The random strategy is a strategy that a random profit 
margin is used for each bidding record. The intelligent strategy is a strategy 
that the bidder always knows the current market type r f, and uses function 
value of equation 4.8 as his profit margin when bidding in the auction. Note 
that in equation 4.8, the maximum profit margin that the bidder can use is 
0.95, so to make the comparison fair, we also set up the same upper bound of 
0. 95 for these three strategies. 2 
Figure 4.5 shows the results of this set of experiments. The left column 
shows four types of dynamic market; the middle column shows the accumu-
lated profit of the test bidder using three strategies in 100 runs; while the 
right column shows the typical adaptation process in a single run. Here, RS 
corresponds to the random strategy, AS corresponds to the adaptive strategy, 
and IS corresponds to the intelligent strategy. 
1 Here, an exponential function is used as the left part of the regression function, and 
actually, it does not matter too much if we use other functions. This is because in the 
second set of experiments, we never use equation 4.8 to estimate the optimal profit margin 
in a market whose r f falls out of (0.5 , 1.2], and the estimated optimal profit margin will not 
vary much if other fit functions are used. 
2 Actually, setting this upper bound does not affect the performance of the adaptive 
strategy. This is because without this constraint, when the optimal profit margin is a value 
infinitely close to 1, the profit margin generated by the adaptive strategy is also very close 
to 1, and the bidder using the adaptive strategy does not losing profit at all. 
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According to the left column, the value of r f, which is the ratio of supplies 
and demands vary over time in each dynamic market. Sometimes supplies 
are more than demands and sometimes supplies are less than demands, which 
simulates the changing of a real dynamic market. Here, we consider two types 
of dynamic markets: gradually changed dynamic markets (Dynamic Market 
I and Dynamic Market II) and abruptly changed dynamic markets (Dynamic 
Market Ill and Dynamic Market IV). In both types of markets, the adaptive 
strategy can be applied and its performance can be evaluated. 3 
From the middle column, we can see that the adaptive strategy performs 
fairly well when compared with the intelligent strategy, and outperforms the 
random strategy much in different market environments. As described above, 
the intelligent strategy is the strategy that performs best among all fixed strate-
gies, so bidder using the intelligent strategy should be regarded as having prior 
knowledge about the market environment and is able to use the approximate 
optimal profit margin to obtain a high profit. On the contrary, the bidder 
using the random strategy can be regarded as not having any prior knowledge 
about the market and will use a random profit margin for every bidding record. 
Therefore, it is impressive that the bidder using the adaptive strategy, can still 
obtain utilities that is about 90% compared to the utilities obtained by the 
bidder using the intelligent strategy in different market environments. As the 
bidder using the adaptive strategy does not need to know the market type 
in advance, we can draw the conclusion that the performance of the adaptive 
strategy is good, even without any prior knowledge about the market. 
In addition, we also show the typical adaptation processes of the profit 
margin in a single run in different markets in the right column. For each type 
of market, we can see that for each dynamic market , the profit margin gener-
ated by the adaptive strategy, which is the blue curve in the figure, can always 
3 We will hold a detail discussion on the scenarios in which the adaptive strategy can be 
applied in the discussion chapter. 
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approach to the approximate optimal profit margin in the current market en-
vironment , which is represented by the red curve. This means that the bidder 
using adaptive strategy is capable of adapting to different dynamic markets. 
In addition, the adaptation speed is very fast: the profit margin can always 
approach the estimated optimal one in tens of rounds even when there is a 
sharp change of the estimated optimal profit margin changes sharply, e.g, the 
change from 0.23 to 0.95 shown in Figure 4.5.i, which guarantees that the 
bidder will obtain a high profit in the auction. 
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Algorithm 4 The Adaptive strategy in dynamic markets 
1: pm== T}, step== e, 6 == 1 and u' == 0. 
2: while auction does not finish do 
3: Use profit margin of pm to bid for the current round 
4: if a new bidding record brb is formed then 
5: Update bhP and compute Ubr(brb)· 
6: u == Ubr(brb) and pm' ==pm. 
7: DecreaseStep (); 
8: IncreaseStep (); 
9: if u == 0 and u' == 0 then 
10: pm == pm - step 
11: else if u =I= 0 and u' =I= 0 then 
12: if u < u' then 
13: pm == pm - 6 x step 
14: else if u > u' then 
15: pm == pm + 6 x step 
16: end if 
17: elseifu==Ooru'==Othen 
18: Compute ubh (bhP I '2:CT) and ubh (bhP I ~CT) 
19: if Ubh(bhPI'2CT) > Ubh(bhPI~CT) then 
20: pm == pm + step 
21: else if Ubh(bhPI'2:CT) < Ubh(bhPj~CT) then 
22: pm == pm - step 
23: end if 
24: end if 
25: if pm > pm' then 
26: 6 == 1 
27: else if pm < pm' then 
28: 6 == -1 
29: end if 
30: u' == u 
31: end if 
32: end while 
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Algorithm 5 Function: DecreaseStep 
1: Compute mean== ± 2:~=1 pmhk. 
2: for k == 0 to A do 
3: wk == 0 
4: if lpmhk - mean! < shk then 
5: wk == 1 
6: end if 
7: end for 
8: if 2:~=1 wk > c/J 
and w1 == 1 and pm =? mean 
and step > a then 
9: Decrease step by r 
10: end if 
Algorithm 6 Function: IncreaseStep 
1: ne gM ove == 0, pas Move == 0. 
2: for i == 0 to ~ - 1 do 
3: if pmhi < pmhi+l then 
4: negMove + + 
5: else 
6: posMove + + 
7: end if 
8: end for 
9: if (ne gM ove > x and 8 == -1 and step < {3) 
or (pas Move > X and 8 == 1 and step < {3) then 
10: Increase step by r 
11: end if 
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Figure 4.5 Performances of the adaptive strategy in different dynamic markets 
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Chapter 5 
A Q-Learning Based Adaptive 
Bidding Strategy in Static 
Markets 
In the previous two chapters, we have introduce an adaptive strategy in static 
and dynamic markets respectively. However, such a strategy is based on heuris-
tics and not well supported by mathematic models. As we know, Q-learning 
is a well defined mathematic model which is guaranteed to converge to the 
optimal policy. Based on the principals of Q-learning and our heuristics of the 
adaptive strategy, we will introduce the Q-learning based adaptive strategy in 
static markets in this chapter. We still use the quasi-linear model: 




where ui(T), vi(R) and Pi(T) are his winning profit, his valuation, and his 
bidding price for bundle T respectively. 
When putting a bid on a resource bundle, a rational bidder will use a 
positive value which is less than his valuation for that bundle, otherwise he will 
get a negative profit when winning. That is to say, if the valuation of bidder i 
for bundle T is vi ( T) , then his bidding price Pi ( T) is Pi ( T) == ( 1 - pmi) x vi ( T), 
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where 0 < pmi < 1. We refer to pmi here as bidder i's profit margin. Combined 
with equation 5.1, the profit of bidder i is hence: 
{ 




The bidder faces the same dilemma on what profit margin to use for a 
resource bundle: bidding with a low profit margin will increase his winning 
probability, but decreases his winning profit at the same time; bidding with a 
high profit margin will lead to a high winning profit, but under a high risk of 
losing. The self-interestedness of the bidder makes this decision problem more 
complex: no one is willing to share his information with others about the 
knowledge of the markets with may put him self in an inferior position when 
competing for resources. In addition, there is one more challenge of combining 
the Q-learning and the adaptive strategy: the training time of Q-learning is 
extremely long which is unaffordable for the bidder who needs to behave in 
a timely way. Our aim here is to design a Q-learning based adaptive bidding 
strategy such that the bidder adopting this strategy can perceive and responds 
to the static markets in a timely way even with limited information, which is 
the main contribution of this work. 
5.1 An Overview of Q-Learning 
Q-learning [46][45] is a reinforcement learning [24)[44] used for solving tasks 
modeled by Markov Decision Processes. It works by learning an action-value 
function that gives the expected profit of taking a given action in a given state 
and following a fixed policy thereafter. The most two significant advantages 
of the Q-learning are that it can compare the expected profit of the avail-
able actions without modeling the environment and it can be used on-line. 
Q-learning is well suited for solving sequential decision problems, where the 
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utilities of actions depends on a sequence of decisions made and there exists 
uncertainty about the dynamics of the environment. 
In the Q-learning framework, the environment which the agent interacts 
with, is a finite-state, discrete-time, stochastic dynamic system. The interac-
tion between the agent and the environment at time t consists of the following 
sequence: 
• The agent senses its state St E S. 
e Based on the state St, the agent choose an action at E A. 
• With probability of Pr st,s; (at), the agent transmits to a new state of 
s; E S. 
• The environment gets a reward r ( St, at) as the consequence of agent 
choosing at at St. 
• The reward r ( St, at) is passed back to the agent and the process is re-
peated. 
The objective of the agent is to determine an optimal policy 1r*, that will 
maximize the total expected discounted reward, which is given by: 
00 
V1r(s) == E{L j)tr(st, 7r(st))lso == s} (5.3) 
t=O 
where E is the expectation operator, 0 < j3 < 1 is a discounted factor, and 1r 
is a policy S ----+ A. v1r ( s) is often called the value function of state s. 
Recall Pr st,s; (at), equation 5.3 can be rewritten as: 
V1r(s) ==E{r(so,JT(so))lso == s}+ 
00 
E{L j)tr(st, 7r(st))lso == s} 
t=l 
(5.4) 
==R( s, 7r( s)) + j3 L Pr s,s* ( 7r( s)) v1r ( s*) 
s* 
where R(s , 1r(s)) == E{r(s, 1r(s))} is the mean of r(s, 1r(s)). 
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Equation 5.4 indicates that the value function of states can be represented 
in terms of the expected immediate reward of the current action and the value 
function of the next state. 
According to Bellman's optimality criterion [7], there is always an optimal 
policy 7r* that satisfies equation 5.4. The objective is to find out the optimal 
policy without prior knowledge about R(s, 1r(s)) and Prs ,s* (K(s)). For a policy 
1r, a Q value is defined as: 
(5.5) 
s* 
which is the expected discounted reward for executing action a at state s and 
then following policy 1r thereafter. 
Let 
Q*(s, a)== Q7T*(s, a) 
== R(s, a)+ f3 L Prs,s*(a)V7T* (s*) (5.6) 
s' 
Then we can get 
V*(s) == max[Q*(s, a)] (5.7) 
a 
Thus the optimal value function V* can be obtained from Q*(s, a), and in 
turn Q*(s, a) may be expressed as: 
Q*(s, a) 
== R(s, a)+ f3 L Prs,s* (a) [~<:x Q*(s*, a*)] (5.8) 
s' 
where s* is the new state reached with probability of Pr s,s* (a) when doing 
action a at state s. 
The Q-learning process tries to find Q* ( s, a) In a recursive way using 
(s, a, s*, R(s, a)) , and the rule is: 
Q ( s, a) == ( 1 - a) · Q ( s, a) + a · [ r ( s, a) + f3 · M] (5.9) 
where M== maxa* Q(s*, a*) and 0 < a < 1 is the learning rate. 
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It has been shown that if the Q-value of each admissible ( s, w( s)) pair is 
visited infinitely, and if the learning rate is decreased to zero in a suitable way, 
then Q(s,w(s)) converges to Q*(s,w(s)) with probability 1. 
5.2 Basic Concepts 
We first introduce some basic concepts used in the Q-learning based adaptive 
bidding strategy. 
Definition 14 A bidding record of a bid b for bidder i is a tuple brb == 
(Tb , vi(Tb), pmb, waitb , winb), where Tb is the requested bundle in b, vi(Tb) is 
i's valuation for Tb, waitb is the number of rounds the bidder has attempted 
bidding with bid b before it is accepted or dropped, and winb is an integer of 
0 or 1 indicating the bidding result for b, that winb equals to 1 if b is finally 
accepted, otherwise 0. 
From the definition, we can see that the maximum value for waitb is T 
and the minimum value for it is 0. In the former case, the bidder keeps on 
attempting for T rounds and finally dropped the bid, and in the latter case , the 
bid b is accepted at the first round when submitted by the bidder. In addition, 
the value of winb can also be inferred from the value of waitb, that winb == 0 
if and only if waitb == T. 
Definition 15 The bidding history of a bidder, which is denoted as cbhP, is 
the sequence of the most recent p bidding records. However, we say that it 
is consistent if and only if all these p bidding records share the same profit 
margin. 
Suppose p > 1, every time when a bid is accepted or dropped, the bidding 
history is updated that the oldest bidding record is removed from the bidding 
history and the newest one is inserted into the bidding history. However, the 
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bidding history is said to be consistent only when the all the containing bidding 
records use the same profit margin. If a bidder uses a fixed profit margin for 
all bidding records, then each history is consistent; if he never uses the same 
profit margin for two consecutive bidding records, then none of his bidding 
history is consistent. 
Definition 16 The state of a bidder, denoted by s, is the profit margin cur-
rently used by this bidder. 
During the auction, the bidder can change his profit margin by either in-
creasing or decreasing its value, which will trigger the transition of his state. 
Definition 17 The action of a bidder at the state of s, denoted by a, is a 
non-zero real number, by which his state will transit from s to s* == s + a for 
the following rounds before the next transition, where the new state s* satisfies 
that 0 < s* < 1. 
From the definition, we can see that every time when an action a is made 
at the state of s, the bidder will transit to a new state s* because of the 
non-zero property of a, which means the bidder will use a new profit margin 
for the following rounds before the next transition, with the constraint that 
0 < s* < 1. 
Definition 18 The reward that a bidder receives from the environment when 
making an action of a at the state of s, denoted as r ( s, a), is defined as: 
( ) * ~brbEcbhP* winb r s, a == s x ---~------~brbEcbhP* ( winb + waitb) (5.10) 
where s* is the new state when choosing the action of a at the state of s, and 
cbhP* is the consistent bidding history formed when the bidder remains at state 
s*. 
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5.3 The Core Algorithm 
Based on the basic concepts defined above, we will describe the core algorithm 
of the Q-learning based adaptive strategy. The main idea is that every time 
when a consistent bidding history is formed, the bidder computers the reward, 
updates the Q-values , and chooses an action according to the updated Q-
values. The bidder remains at the new state in the subsequent rounds before 
the next transition of the state. Through transitions, the bidder will transit 
among different states, and finally approach to the optimal state. Here, the 
optimal state refers to the one that maximizes the bidder 's accumulated profit 
in the long term run. 
We first give a notation and a definition. 
Notation 6 We say that state s is e close to state s*, denoted as s <e s* , if 
and only if Is- s*l <e. 
Definition 19 The Q-value of the state set-action pair (L, a), where L C S, 
is defined as the average Q-values of pair (s, a), where s E L. That is: 
1 Q(L, a) = TLi L Q(s, a) 
sEL 
(5.11) 
The adaptive strategy is illustrated in Algorithm 1. We use s to denote the 
bidder 's current state, which is obtained by doing action a' at states' , and use 
s* to denote the next state if action a' is carried on s. We also use r and r' to 
denote the reward obtained by the bidder when reaching the state of s' and s 
respectively. In addition, we use a variable of VQ(s,a) to indicate the number 
of times that the state-action pair ( s, a) has been visited, which is initialized 
with 0 at the beginning of the algorithm. 
The adaptive strategy is illustrated in Algorithm 1. 
At the beginning, state setS and action set A are initialized with { Sini} and 
{ +8, -8} respectively, and then some variables used in the algorithm are also 
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initialized (line 1 and 2). During the process the auction, the bidder remains 
at the current state of s, and transit to a new state every time when 1) a new 
consistent bidding history with length p is formed and 2) () is greater than 
the threshold value of E. The bidder first computes the reward of the previous 
state-action pair r( s', a') according to equation 5.10 (line 6), then updates the 
Q-values for pairs ( s', a') and ( s, a') using the following equations (line 7 and 
8): 
(1- a)· Q(s', a')+ a· [r(s', a')+ j3 ·M] 
Q( s', a') == if VQ(s',a') > 0 (5.12) 
r( s' , a') otherwise 
where M== maxaQ(L,a) for L == {s#ls# <os} and 
( 1 - a) · Q ( s, a') + a · [ r ( s', a') + j3 · M] 
Q(s, a') == if VQ(s,a') > 0 (5.13) 
r( s', a') otherwise 
where M== maxa Q(L, a) for for L == { s#ls# <os*} and s* == s +a'. 
Note that here we save the value of Q(s , a') to a temporary variable of 
q before updating. This is because that actually, r( s' , a') should be used to 
update Q(s' , a') rather than Q(s , a'). Updating Q(s, a') with r(s' , a') means 
that we transcendentally hope that doing action a' at the state of s will bring 
the bidder the same reward as that of doing action a' at the state of s'. The 
updated Q(s, a') will be used for deciding the action at the state of s, after 
which it is restored to original value of q (line 26). 
Then the bidder check the decreasing condition fore and decrease its value 
if necessary (line 9 to 14), and choose an action according to the following rules 
(line 15 to 25): I) if both state-action pairs of ( s , a') and ( s , -a') have been 
visited before, the bidder will choose the action with the higher Q-value; II) 
if neither of them have been visited before, which means that () has just been 
decreased, the bidder will first choose the action assuming that decrease of () 
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does not happen, and then decrease the chosen action by !'; Ill) otherwise, if 
r > r', which means that doing action a' has led to an increase on reward, 
then we continue this action; else if r < r', which means that doing action a' 
has led to a decrease on reward, then we opposite oppose this action. 
After that, the bidder transits to the new state according to the selected 
action (line 27), updates the state set S if necessary (line 28 to 30) and call the 
function of FillUpQValues (line 31), by which a transition of state has finished. 
Such a transition will be repeated until () is smaller than a threshold E, after 
which the bidder will remain at that state for all subsequent rounds until the 
auction finishes. 
Next, we will introduce the two functions of Decrease() and FillUpQValues 
in detail. 
Function of DecreaseO 
The value of () is decreased to make sure that the bidder's state can be more 
approached to the optimal state. However, as the as we can see, the second 
term used for computing the reward of a state-action pair is vulnerable to 
noises. Here, we say it is vulnerable because from the definition of the reward, 
we can see that the second term is actually the winning probability of the 
bidder remaining at the state of s* when p is large enough: theoretically if we 
refer to Pwin(Pmi) as the that winning probability, then the larger the value of 
p is, generally the closer to Pwin (pm) the second term is. However, the value 
of p cannot be set to a large value because the bidder also needs to adapt 
to the environment in a timely manner. Therefore, the second term can be 
only regarded as an approximation of the winning probability, by which an 
algorithm that is robust against noises is needed when decreasing the value of 
(). We first give some definitions and notations. 
Definition 20 The state history, which is denoted as sh, is a sequence of A 
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real numbers, in which the kth element, shk, is the bidder's kth most recent 
state. 
Definition 21 The e history, denoted as Bh, is a sequence of A real numbers, 
in which the kth element ()hk, is the action used when when the bidder transits 
from shk-l to shk. 
Notation 7 We say that the state s goes towards a value 1r, denoted as s =? 1r 
if 1) s < 1r and the next action of the bidder a > 0 or 2) s > 1r and the next 
action of the bidder a < 0. 
The function of Decrease() is given in Algorithm 2. At first, we compute 
the mean value of the elements in s h (line 1), then for each element we check 
whether the distance between shk and mean is no more than ()hk and use a 0 
or 1 variable wk to indicate the result (line 2 to 7). On deciding whether to 
decrease (), we check three conditions (line 8): the first one checks whether at 
least cjJ elements in sh are close to mean in terms of the action chosen then , 
by which we regard mean as an approximation of the optimal state, and the 
second and the third ones together guarantee that the optimal state can be 
further approached if () is decrease. If all conditions hold, true is returned. 
Our illustration for this function is the same as algorithm 3.3: as the second 
term used for computing the reward is vulnerable to noises and thus makes 
the reward inaccurate, the transited state may converge to a suboptimal one 
if we use the way described in section 3.1. One possible solution is to view the 
transition of the bidder 's state as a random event: although sometimes the 
transition will make the bidder 's state deviate from the optimal one, generally 
it will go towards the optimal one. Therefore, the state history of the bidder 
is checked before the value of () is decreased to remove the noises. 
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Function of FillUpQValues 
As the name denotes , we fill up the Q-values for some state-action pairs in 
this function according to others values in the Q-matrix. This is because 
according to our definition of reward in equation 5.10, for two state-action 
pairs of ( s1 , a1 ) and ( s2 , a2 ), their rewards, and also their Q-values if combined 
with the definition in equation 5.8, should be the same if s1 +a1 == s2 +a2 when 
p* is infinitely large. In addition, the Q-values for some pairs should be close to 
tho~e for some others , e.g. the Q-values for state-action pairs of (0.8, 0.05) and 
(0.78, 0.05) should be close to each other , although 0.8 + 0.05-/= 0.78 + 0.05. 
The function of FillUpQValues is given in Algorithm 3.3. For each state 
in s E S and each action in a E A, if its Q-value Q(s, a) has not been visited 
before , then we compute the state set whose elements are e close to s +a (line 
4). If such state set is not empty, we first approximate the Q-value of the 
state-action pair ( s, a) with that of this state set-action pair ( L, a) (line 6), 
and then add the value of VQ(s ,a) by 1 (line 7). 
The reason that we need this function is explained as follows. From the 
algorithm we can see that when deciding the bidder 's action, three cases are 
considered, in which the first one is the most preferred because the decision 
is made based on the comparison among the only two available choices. How-
ever , when new states and actions are added into the state set and the action 
set respectively, the Q-values for these state-action pairs are 0. We want to 
get their approximations based on the ideas described above according to the 
existing values in the Q-matrix, which can help to increase the probability 
that a right decision is made. We say a decision is right if it help to transit 
the bidder's current towards the optimal one, otherwise we say it as wrong. 
For each state-action pair, its Q-value is initialized with the Q-value of a state 
set-action pair in which the state is e closed and the action is the same. Here, 
we consider the criteria of e close because 1) the Q-values for the state-action 
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pairs of (s, a) and (s#, a) should be close to each other ifs# <e s +a 2) we use 
the average Q-value of multiple state-action pairs to remove the noises brought 
by the second term used for computing the reward. 
5.4 Experimental Evaluation 
To evaluate the performance of the Q-learning based adaptive strategy, we 
conducted two sets of experiments. In the first set of experiments, the perfor-
mances of different fixed strategies are compared in different markets in order 
to find out the best fixed strategies, which are used to generate the intelligent 
strategy. A fix strategy is a strategy that keeps the bidder remaining at a 
same state during the process of the auction. In the second set of experiments , 
we compare the performances of the adaptive strategy (AS), the Q-learning 
based adaptive strategy(Q-AS), the random strategy (RS), and the intelligent 
strategy (IS). The Adaptive strategy is the strategy that we proposed in chap-
ter 3, which also achieve good results in different static markets. The random 
strategy is a strategy that the bidder randomly transit among different states 
for different bidding records. The intelligent strategy is the strategy that arti-
ficially generated according to the results of the first set of experiments. As the 
adaptive strategy also performs well in different static markets, we compare 
the adaptive strategy and the Q-learning based adaptive strategy in detail. In 
addition, we also show the typical adaptation process of the state of the bidder 
who uses the Q-learning based adaptive strategy in a single run in different 
markets. 
5.4.1 Experiment Setup 
In our experiments, each combinatorial auction is repeated for 500 rounds and 
an iteration of 500 rounds is referred to as a run. Motivated by other works 
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[1] [41], in each run, we have one test bidder using strategy X and others bid-
ding their true valuations. Here, X can be the adaptive strategy, the random 
strategy, the Q-learning based adaptive strategy or the intelligent strategy. 
The performances of different strategies are compared through accumulated 
utilities of the test bidder in 100 runs. The reason that multiple runs are used 
is that we want to eliminate the uncertainty brought by the random initializa-
tion of the valuations of the bundles. 
Settings of these experiments are as follows. A group of n == 60 users 
are competing for m == 4 types of resources with capacities of 90, 60, 60, 30 
respectively provided by a resource provider. For each bidder, numbers of 
units that he can request for different resources are integers randomly drawn 
from uniform distributions of [0, 3], [0, 2], [0, 2] and [0, 1] respectively, which 
means dj == 3, 2, 2, 1 for j == 1, 2, 3, 4. 
At the beginning of each run, each bidder initializes his valuations for all 
resource bundles. His valuations for single unit of different resources are real 
numbers randomly drawn from uniform distributions of [3, 6], [4, 8], [4, 8] 
and [6, 10] respectively. For a resource bundle T, which contains more than 
one type of resource, the valuation is generated as follows: there is a synergy 
seed syn(T) which is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution of [-0.2, 0.2], 
and his valuation for that bundle is the product of sum valuations of individual 
resources and 1 + syn(T), which means: 
m 
vi(T) == (E Vj · tj) x (1 + syn(T)) (5.14) 
j=l 
where positive synergy seed means there are complementarities among re-
sources and negative synergy seed means there are substitutabilities among 
them. 
Here, a ratio factor r f is used to denote a market type: if the ratio of total 
supplies and demands in the market is equals to r f : 1, we say that this is 
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a r f : 1 market. For example, when the total supplies of different resources 
are 90, 60, 60 and 30 respectively, the total supplies and expected demands 
are equal, so in this case, we say that the market is a 1 : 1 market. In our 
experiments, because the expected total demands of resources from users are 
fixed, we simulate the dynamics of the market by varying the value of r f. 
This value is changed from time to time during the auction, which means that 
our simulations has comprehensively considered different market types, e.g. 
supplies are more than demands, supplies are nearly equal to demands and 
supplies are less than demands. 
Parameters used in experiments are showed in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Parameters used in experiments of the Q-learning based adaptive 
strategy in static markets 
Parameter Value Description 
T 3 Maximum attempting round 
p 5 Length of a bidding history 
Sini 0.05 Bidder's initial state 
() 0.1 Initial value for () 
E 0.01 Threshold for () to stop transition 
A 10 Length of a profit margin history 
cP 7 Threshold to decrease e 
' 
1.4 Degree of decrease for () 
In addition, we use fixed learning rate of a 0.2 and discount rate of 
f3 == 0.1. 
5.4.2 Experiment Results and Analysis 
In the first set of experiments, we try to find out the optimal profit margins 
in different market environments with a family of fix strategies. We have 19 
different fixed strategies in the family, and for the kth strategy, the profit 
margin of pmk is used by the test bidder during the whole 100 runs, where 
pmk == k x 0.05 for k == 1, 2, ... , 19. For each market type, we compute the 
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accumulated profit of the test bidder using different fixed strategies and find 
out the best fixed strategy which performs best among all fixed strategies. 
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Figure 5.1 shows the results of the this set of experiments. In the figure, 
from top to bottom, each of the eight curves represent a market type from 
1.2 : 1 to 0.5 : 1 respectively, and for each market type, the accumulated 
utilities of the test bidder using 19 different fixed strategies are marked as dots 
on that line. From the figure , we can see that for different market type, the best 
fixed profit margin is different: the more competitive the market is, the smaller 
the value of the best fixed profit margin is. For example, in the 1.2 : 1 market , 
where bidders face few competitions from others, _ the best fixed profit margin 
is 0.95 , and in the 0.5 : 1 market, where bidders face fierce competitions from 
others , the best fixed profit margin is 0.15 . This corresponds to our common 
sense that it is better for a bidder to use different profit margins in different 
markets: in a market that is short of competition, it is better for a bidder 
to use a high profit margin to obtain a high profit, while in a market that is 
highly competitive, it is better for a bidder to use a low profit margin to beat 
others. 
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Based on this result, the optimal profit margins in different market types 
are approximated as follows. Knowing the best fix profit margins for different 
market types, e.g. in the 0.5 : 1 market the best fixed profit margin is 0.15 and 
in the 1.2 : 1 market the best fixed profit margin is 0.95 , we use a regression 
method to model the optimal profit margin as a function with the ratio factor 
r f as the parameter, which is shown in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5. 2 Estimation of the optimal state 
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Each red point represent the best fixed profit margin in that market type, 
e.g. the red point (0.7, 0.2) means that in the 0.7: 1 market, the fixed strategy 
that keeps the bidder using the profit margin of 0.2 performs best among all 
fixed strategies. We use a piecewise function pmopt(r f) to fit the red points, 
which is given by: 
{ 
a X br f + c r f < d 
pmopt(r f) == 
e rf > d 
(5.15) 
The result of the regression is that a== 0.0001382 , b == 2561.574, c == 0.1683, 
e == 0.95 and d == 1.109873, which is shown by the blue line in Figure 5.2. We 
can see that it fits the red points very well, and in the following , when talking 
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about the optimal profit margin in the market type r f, we will use the function 
value as the approximate, which is how the intelligent strategy works. 1 
Figure 5.3 shows the results for the second set of experiments. Here, per-
formances of three other different strategies are compared through the ratio of 
the accumulated utilities achieved by them and that achieved by the intelligent 
strategy generated according to equation 5.15. Note that in equation 5.15, the 
maximum value for state that the bidder can remain at is 0.95, so to make the 
comparison fair, we also set up the same upper bound of 0.95 for these three 
str~tegies. 2 
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1 Here, an exponential function is used as the left part of the regression function, and 
actually, it does not matter too much if we use other functions. This is because in the 
second set of experiments, we never use equation 5.15 to estimate the optimal state in a 
market whose r f falls out of [0.5 , 1.2], and the estimated optimal state will not vary much 
if other fit functions are used. 
2 Actually, setting this upper bound does not affect the performance of the adaptive 
strategy. This is because without this constraint, when the optimal profit marrrin is a value 
infinitely close to 1, the profit margin generated by the adaptive strategy is a~o very close 
to 1, and the bidder using t he adaptive strategy does not losing profit at all. 
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From Figure 5,3, we can see that both the adaptive strategy and the Q-
learning based adaptive strategy perform well, and outperform the random 
strategy much in different market environments. What is more, the Q-learning 
based adaptive strategy has an improvement on performances to the adaptive 
strategy from 2% to 5%. As described above, the intelligent strategy is artifi-
cially generated according to a set of fixed strategies, so the bidder using this 
strategy can be regarded as having prior knowledge about the market environ-
ment and is able to remain at the optimal state to obtain a high profit. On the 
contrary, the bidder using the random strategy can be regarded as not hav-
ing any prior knowledge about the market and will transit randomly among 
different state for different bidding records. Therefore, it is very impressive 
that performances of the adaptive strategy and the Q-learning based adaptive 
strategy can be as high as about 90% of that of the intelligent strategy in 
different market environments. As the bidder using the adaptive strategy or 
the Q-learning based adaptive strategy does not need to know the market type 
in advance, we can draw the conclusion that the bidder using either strategy 
performs well in different markets, even without any prior knowledge. 
To explore the reason that the Q-learning based strategy outperforms the 
adaptive strategy, we conduct the following experiment. We test the perfor-
mances of another strategy Q-AS-NoF, which is the same as the Q-learning 
based adaptive strategy except that we do not call the FillUpQValues func-
tion in the algorithm (line 31) , and show its performance with the green line 
in Figure 5.3. Recall the algorithm of the adaptive strategy, we find that it 
shares the same principle with Q-AS-NoF but with a few differences, and it 
is also reasonable that it performs comparably with Q-AS-NoF. Summarizing 
the above results, we can come to the conclusion that the function FillUpQVal-
ues mainly contributes to the improvement of the Q-learning based adaptive 
strategy on performances over the adaptive strategy, by which the bidder will 
have a higher probability to make a right decision on his action according to 
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the historical information. 
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We also compare the performances of the adaptive strategy and the Q-
learning based adaptive strategy in each run in eight types of market from 
0.5: 1 to 1.2: 1, whose results are shown in Figure 5.4. For each type of market, 
the diagonal red line is a line that a point on which means the performances of 
the adaptive strategy and the Q-learning based adaptive strategy are the same, 
and the X-coordinate and Y-coordinate are the utilities achieved by the test 
bidder using the adaptive strategy and the Q-learning based adaptive strategy 
respectively. Therefore, if a point falls into the left part of the diagonal line, 
it means the Q-learning based adaptive strategy outperforms the adaptive 
strategy in this run; if a point falls into the right part of the diagonal line, 
it means the adaptive strategy outperforms the Q-learning based adaptive 
strategy in this run. From Figure 5.4, we can see that for each type of market, 
the points falling into the left part of the line are more then those falling into the 
right part of the line, which means that in most cases, the performance of the 
Q-learning based adaptive strategy is better than that of the adaptive strategy. 
However , there are still cases in which the adaptive strategy outperforms the 
Q-learning based adaptive strategy, which needs further explorations. 
In addition, we also show the typical adaptation process of the state of the 
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bidder who uses the Q-learning based adaptive strategy in a single run in four 
types of market: 0.6:1, 0.8:1, 1.0:1 and 1.2:1. For each type of market, the 
horizontal line represents the optimal state that the bidder should remain at 
in that type of market. 
Figure 5.5 The typical convergency process of the bidder's state in a single 
run in different markets 
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From Figure 5.5 , we can see that for each type of market, the transited 
state of the Q-learning based adaptive strategy has finally converged to the 
optimal state in that market type, which means the Q-learning based adaptive 
strategy is capable of learning and adapting in different markets. In addition, 
the convergence speed is fast: for each market type, the test bidder's state has 
converged at about the 200th round (If we consider the case of "close to" , the 
situation is even better: the test bidder's state has converged to the optimal 
one at about the 100th round). 3 The bidder keeps remaining at that state in 
3You tnay find that the convergence speed is slower than that in the adaptive strategy 
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subsequent rounds , which guarantees the Q-learning based adaptive strategy 
can generate a very good profit compared to the intelligent strategy. 
in ~ta~ic. Actually: this is because in this experiment , the value of the parameter "'( = 1.4, 
while In the adaptive strategy in static market s, the value of the parameter "'( = 2. 
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Algorithm 7 The Q-learning based adaptive strategy in static markets 
1: St---{sini}, At-{ +B, -B} 
2: r' == 0, s' == s == Sini, Q(s , +B) > 0. 
3: while auction does not finish do 
4: Keep at the state of s 
5: if a new cbhP is formed and g > E then 
6: Set s' == s and compute r == r( s', a'). 
7: Update Q(s',a') with equation 5.12 and Q(s' ,a')++. 
8: q == Q(s, a'), update Q(s , a' ) with equation 5.13 and Q(s , a')++. 
9: if DecreaseB() == true then 
1o: e == e ;, 
11: if e t/:. A then 
12: A f- A U{ +B, -e} 
13: end if 
14: end if 
15: if VQ(s ,a') > 0 and VQ( s,-a' ) > 0 then 
16: a == arg maxa*EA,ia*i=eQ( s, a*) 
17: else if VQ(s ,a') == 0 and VQ(s,-a') == 0 then 
18: a== arg maxa*EA,Ia*I=O·f'Q(s, a*)/r 
19: else 




23: a== -a' 
24: end if 
25: end if 
26: Q(s, a') == q and Q(s , a') - -. 
27: s == s + a , r' == r 
28: if s t/:. S then 
29: S t- SU{s} 
30: end if 
31: FillUpQValues (). 
32: end if 
33: end while 
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Algorithm 8 Function: DecreaseS 
1: Compute mean == ± 2::~= 1 shk. 
2: for k == 0 to A do 
3: wk == 0 
4: if ishk -mean! < ()hk then 
5: wk == 1 
6: end if 
7: end for 
8: if 2:::~= 1 wk > cjJ and w 1 == 1 and s => mean then 
9: return true 
10: end if 
Algorithm 9 Function: FillUpQValues 
1: for each s E S do 
2: for each a E A do 






L == { s# Is# < e s + a} 
if ILl > 0 then 
Q(s, a) == Q(L, a) 
VQ(s,a)++. 
end if 
9: end if 
10: end for 
11: end for 
Chapter 6 
Discussion 
In this section, we will have a brief discussion on the proposed strategies. 
Because all these three strategies are quite similar, the discussion applies to 
any of them. In this chapter, we will use the term "adaptive strategies" to 
refer to all of them. 
6.1 Applicability of the Adaptive Strategies 
The first question is that in what situations the adaptive strategies can be used. 
In this work, we have introduced the adaptive strategies in static markets and 
gradually or abruptly changed dynamic markets. Actually, no matter how the 
market environment changes, if the dynamics of the market leaves space for 
adaptation, then the adaptive strategies can be used. Here, we say a market 
leaves space for adaptation or is adaptable if for each agent, the estimated 
optimal profit margin can not change abruptly with a high frequency. In 
our simulations, we consider the static markets and dynamic markets with 
gradually or abruptly changed capacities, in all of which there is adaptation 
space left for the bidders: for the static markets, the dynamics does not change; 
for the gradually changed markets, the dynamics changes frequently but not 
abruptly; for the abruptly changed markets, the dynamics changes abruptly 
but not frequently. So in all the three cases, adaptation space is left that 
82 
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there is time for the agent to adapt to the market environment. However, 
consider a scenario when two agent a 1 and a2 are competing for a single unit 
of a reusable resource in a multi-round auction. If for each round, the agent a2 
bids a random price which greater than 0 and lower than his valuation, then 
no adaptation space is left for agent a1 . This is because the dynamics of the 
market changes both frequently and abruptly such that a1 's new best response 
changes remarkably before the old one is adapted to. In scenarios like this, the 
adaptive strategy can not be used. 
6.2 Generalization of the Adaptive Strategies 
Next, we want to talk about the generalization of our adaptive strategies. The 
fist one is the use of bidding languages in the adaptive strategies. Generally 
when we talk about the bidding languages , four types of bidding languages 
are referred to: single-minded, OR, XOR and their combinations. The single-
minded bid is the one we introduce in this work that each bidder only submit a 
single bid. The OR bid means that for a bid "T1 OR T2", the bidder wants to 
get T1 or T2 or both of them. The XOR bid means that for a bid "T1 XOR T2" , 
the bidder wants to get only one of T1 and T2 . The combination bid means 
the combinations of single-minded bids, OR bids and XOR bids. Although we 
assume the case of single-minded bids in this work, it can be easily generalized 
to the other three cases as follows: for an OR bid, it is equivalent to a set 
of separate single-minded bids from different bidders; for a XOR bid, it is 
equivalent to a set of separate single-minded bids from different bidders with 
one more constraint that they are not allowed to win simultaneously; and for 
a combination bid, we can combine the equivalence from single-minded, OR 
and XOR bids. Therefore, the assumption of using single-minded bids does 
not affect the generality of the adaptive strategies. 
Another point is the reserve prices which exist in most auction applications. 
Chapter 6 Discussion 84 
As we can see in this work that no reserve prices are used for the resource 
bundles (or we can say, the reserve prices for all bundles are 0), which may 
lead to a great loss for the auctioneer. For example, in a 1 : 1.2 market, where 
supplies are far more than demands, the bidder using any adaptive strategy 
can win the resources with very low prices: the bidder only pays 0.05 of his 
valuations to get the resource bundles and obtain a high profit. 1 This means 
that the auctioneer can get little money by providing the resources. The 
reserve prices can help to guarantee the auctioneer's revenue and are widely 
used in real applications of auctions. The reserve price for a resource bundle 
T is Pr ( T) means that the resource bundle T is allocated to the winning agent 
i, which is computed by equation 2.1, if and only if Pi(T) > Pr(T). If reserve 
prices are introduced into the combinatorial auctions: for those cases in which 
the deal price is greater than or equal to the reserve price, the performances 
of the adaptive strategies are not affected; for those cases in which the deal 
price is smaller than the reserve price, the profit margin of the bidder using any 
adaptive strategy will converge to a value such that his bidding prices are nearly 
the same as the reserves prices, which will also not deteriorate the performances 
of the adaptive strategies when compared with the intelligent strategy, in which 
the bidder uses the reserve prices as the his bidding prices. Hereby, we can say 
. that introducing reserve prices into the combinatorial auctions will not also 
affect the generality of the adaptive strategies. 
Finally, we want to emphasize that although we consider the scenario of us-
ing the adaptive strategies in combinatorial auctions-based resource allocation 
problem in this work, the proposed strategies are not limited to combinato-
rial auctions. Actually, for any type of multi-round auctions, the proposed 
strategies can be used if the profit index (reward) is appropriately defined. 
For example, in a continuous double auction, the buyer can use the proposed 
1 If we do not set the upper bound of 0.95 for bidder 's profit margin in the adaptive 
strategies, the bidder can get the resources nearly free. 
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strategies without any modification. The adaptive strategies can help the agent 
to behave strategically in the auctions and achieve good performance in term 
of profit , by which we can say that our adaptive strategies generalizes well. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion and Future Work 
7.1 Conclusion 
With the popularity of Internet and the emerging applications on it, the use of 
economic models to solve the resource allocation problem in the network is re-
ceiving more and more attention from both computer scientists and economist. 
Among these economic models, combinatorial auctions where bidders are al-
lowed to put bids on bundles of items and express the complementarities and 
substitutabilities among these items, have been a vibrant research topic in the 
last few decades. 
Although many works have been conducted on combinatorial auctions, 
most of them focus on the winner determination problem and the auction de-
sign. A large unexplored research area in combinatorial auctions is the design 
of bidding strategies. There are some existing works on the bidding strategies 
in combinatorial auctions, however none of them is adaptive, which means that 
the proposed strategies are restricted to certain types of markets and do not 
generalize well. 
As the combinatorial auctions are usually incorporated with the first-price 
sealed-bid auction protocol in many applications, we are especially interested 
in designing bidding strategies in this type of auction. In this work, we consider 
a scenario in which the first-price sealed-bid combinatorial auctions are used 
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to distribute computational resources among a group of users, each of whom 
needs a bundle of resource to perform his own task. We propose a set of 
adaptive bidding strategies: an adaptive strategy in static markets, an adaptive 
strategy in dynamic markets and a Q-Learning based adaptive strategy in 
static markets. Our main contributions in this work are that: 
- The bidder using any of them can adjust his profit margin (state) dur-
ing the process of the auction based on his bidding histories, and thus 
- perceives and responses to the market in a timely way. 
- The bidder using any of them performs fairly well and obtains hight 
utilities when compared with the bidder using other strategies in different 
market environments , even without any prior knowledge. 
- The bidder using any of them is capable of adapting to the current market 
environment in either static or dynamic markets , and the adaptation 
speed is very fast . 
Through simulations, the proposed adaptive strategies are verified in dif-
ferent market environments , e.g. from the market where supplies are more 
than demands, to the market where supplies are equal to demands , and then 
to the market where supplies are less than demands. Simulation results show 
that for each of them, the performance is much better than that of the ran-
dom strategy, and is very good when compared with the intelligent strategy. 
Considering the case that the bidder using the random strategy and the intel-
ligent strategy can be regarded as having no and full prior knowledge about 
the market environment respectively, it is very impressive that the bidder us-
ing any adaptive strategy performs so well without any prior knowledge. We 
also show the typical adaptation processes of the profit margin (state) of the 
bidder using any adaptive strategy. From the results we can see that the bid-
der's profit margin (state) is adjusted from time to time in the auction and 
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gradually converges to the optimal one, which explains the reason that the 
bidder can adapt to the current market environment timely. In addition, the 
adaptation speed is very fast that the profit margin (state) of the bidder using 
any adaptive strategy can quickly converge to the optimal one, which helps 
the bidder to obtain high utilities in the auction in either static or dynamic 
markets. 
7.2 Future Work 
Besides more extensive empirical evaluations and those points we have men-
tioned in the discussion chapter, this work can be extended in the following 
several directions. 
First, we assume that the resources to be auctioned are reusable in this 
work. e.g. computational resources like CPU time and memory spaces. Ac-
tually, there are also many applications where the auctioned resources are 
non-reusable. In the future, we are going to study how the adaptive strategies 
can be used in such type of auction. 
Second, in this work, we use the fixed values for the parameters in the 
adaptive strategies. Next step, we want to make them also adaptive within the 
adaptive strategies to further improve their performances, e.g. use a smaller 
value for "'! when we want to approach the optimal profit margin (state) more 
accurately and use a larger value for "'! when we want to adapt to the new 
market environment more quickly. 
Another direction is that in this work, even for the dynamic markets, we 
assume that the bidders participating the auctions are the same during the 
whole process. Next step, we want to study the performances of the adaptive 
strategies in a more complicated and realistic case where there are new bidders 
coming and old ones leaving during the auction. 
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Finally, as we have mentioned in the discussion chapter, the proposed adap-
tive strategies are not limited to combinatorial auctions and can be generalized 
to any type of multi-round auctions by redefining the bidder's profit index (re-
ward). In the future, we are interested in applying these strategies into other 
types of auctions and analyzing their performances. 
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